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Abstract
We are at the dawn of a new age of Open Finance. Open Finance seeks to
harness the potential of new platform technology to enhance customer data
access, sharing, portability, and interoperability—thereby leveling the informational
playing field and fostering greater competition between incumbent financial
institutions and a new breed of fintech disruptors. According to its proponents,
this competition will yield a radical restructuring of the financial services industry:
offering more and better choices for consumers looking to make fast payments,
borrow money, invest their savings, manage household budgets, and compare
financial products and services. The promise of Open Finance is very real. Yet
its proponents have largely ignored the economics driving the development of
the key players at the heart of this new infrastructure: data aggregators. Data
aggregators are the connective tissue of Open Finance—the pipes through which
the majority of this valuable data flows. Like other types of infrastructure, these
pipes are characterized by economies of scale and network effects that erect
substantial barriers to entry, undercut competition, and propel the market toward
monopoly. In the United States, these dynamics are compounded by the highly
fragmented structure of both the conventional financial services industry and
the emerging fintech ecosystem. The result is an embryonic market structure in
which a small handful of data aggregators have a massive head start, and where
one in particular—Plaid—arguably already enjoys a dominant market position.
This Article describes the promise and perils of Open Finance and explains how
policymakers can tap into its potential while simultaneously preventing the abuse
of monopoly power and avoiding the creation of a new strain of too-big-to-fail
institutions.
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The Promise & Perils of Open Finance
Joshua Macey & Dan Awrey

We are at the dawn of a new age of Open Finance. Open Finance seeks to harness the
potential of new platform technology to enhance customer data access, sharing, portability,
and interoperability—thereby leveling the informational playing field and fostering greater
competition between incumbent financial institutions and a new breed of fintech disruptors.
According to its proponents, this competition will yield a radical restructuring of the financial
services industry: offering more and better choices for consumers looking to make fast
payments, borrow money, invest their savings, manage household budgets, and compare
financial products and services. The promise of Open Finance is very real. Yet its proponents
have largely ignored the economics driving the development of the key players at the heart of
this new infrastructure: data aggregators.
Data aggregators are the connective tissue of Open Finance—the pipes through which
the majority of this valuable data flows. Like other types of infrastructure, these pipes are
characterized by economies of scale and network effects that erect substantial barriers to entry,
undercut competition, and propel the market toward monopoly. In the United States, these
dynamics are compounded by the highly fragmented structure of both the conventional
financial services industry and the emerging fintech ecosystem. The result is an embryonic
market structure in which a small handful of data aggregators have a massive head start, and
where one in particular—Plaid—arguably already enjoys a dominant market position. This
Article describes the promise and perils of Open Finance and explains how policymakers can
tap into its potential while simultaneously preventing the abuse of monopoly power and
avoiding the creation of a new strain of too-big-to-fail institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the world of finance, the most precious commodity is information. The great banking
dynasties of the Renaissance and Industrial Revolution—the Houses of Fugger and Medici,
Rothschild and Morgan—all famously used their privileged access to information to amass
enormous fortunes and wield political power on the global stage.1 From their earliest
beginnings, the London and New York Stock Exchanges were organized for the explicit
purpose of preventing the dissemination of information about prevailing stock prices to
anyone other than exchange members.2 And today, hedge fund managers relentlessly chase
down and jealously guard any and all information that they think can give them even the
slightest edge over other investors.3 These and myriad other examples reflect the golden rule
See GREG STEINMETZ, THE RICHEST MAN WHO EVER LIVED: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JACOB
FUGGER (2015); PAUL STRATHERN, THE MEDICI: POWER, MONEY AND AMBITION IN THE ITALIAN
RENAISSANCE (2016); NIALL FERGUSON, THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD: MONEY’S PROPHETS 1798-1848 (1998),
and RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN (1990).
2 See Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1453, 1490-1491 (1997) (describing
London Stock Exchange rules restricting the dissemination of trading information); Harold Mulherin, Jeffry
Netter, & James Overdahl, Prices as Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a Property Law Perspective, 43
J. LAW & ECON. 591, 606-617 (1991) (describing New York Stock Exchange rules restricting the dissemination
of trading information).
1

In this respect, hedge fund managers are the prototypical “professionally informed traders”; see Ron
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70:4 VIRGINIA L. REV. 549, 569 and 594 (1984)
3
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of conventional finance: the party that can obtain and control the flow of information
ultimately gets the gold.
The golden rule of conventional finance has long been reflected in the relationship
between banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, and their customers. The process of
opening a new bank or brokerage account, applying for a loan, or taking out an insurance
policy inevitably demands that customers hand over an enormous amount of personal
information. Once this relationship is established, these financial institutions are then often in
a position to collect additional information about what these customers buy, how they manage
their money, and whether they pay their debts. In theory, these institutions can use this
information to provide customers with better financial products and services. Yet in practice,
this information ends up locked away in a legal, technological, and economic vault to which
only incumbent financial institutions have the key.4
For centuries, exclusive access to these informational vaults has given incumbents a
distinct advantage over both their own customers and potential competitors. But the world is
changing before our very eyes. Today, rapid advances in information technology hold out the
tantalizing prospect of unlocking these vaults. This technology includes application
programming interfaces—or APIs—that enable incumbent banks, brokerage firms, and
insurance companies to request and share customer information with other financial
institutions.5 These APIs are the technological backbone of an emerging financial market
infrastructure designed to enhance data access, sharing, portability, and interoperability.6 In
the view of many observers, the emergence of this new infrastructure signals the dawn of a
new age: the age of Open Finance.
The promise of Open Finance stems from its potential to dramatically reduce the legal
and technological barriers that have historically made it difficult for customers to access their
information, prevented them from easily sharing it with third parties, and thus deterred them
from switching between the products and services offered by different financial institutions.7
By reducing these barriers, Open Finance seeks to level the informational playing field, thereby
promoting greater competition not only among incumbent financial institutions, but also
between these incumbents and a new breed of “fintech” disruptors. These disruptors include
online lending platforms such as SoFi and Lending Circle, stock trading and investment apps
such as Robinhood, Betterment, and Acorns, and payment platforms such as PayPal, Venmo,
Circle, and Wise.8 In the eyes of its proponents, this competition will drive a radical
restructuring of the financial services industry—offering more and better choices for

(explaining that professionally informed traders are investors that have made the human capital and other
investments necessary to identify which pieces of information are relevant to the pricing of a given security, along
with the likely impact of this information on its market price).
4

These metaphorical vaults are described in greater detail in Part II.

5

The mechanics, role, and types of APIs are described in greater detail in Part I.A.
These core principles of Open Finance are described in greater detail in Part I.A.

6
7
8

The promise of Open Finance is described in greater detail in Part II.
The business of models of these fintech disruptors are described in Parts I.B and II.
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consumers looking to make fast payments, borrow money, invest their savings, manage
household budgets, and compare financial products and services.
The promise of Open Finance is very real. Yet the shift toward Open Finance will
inevitably force financial institutions and policymakers to confront a host of thorny technical
challenges. Paramount amongst these challenges is ensuring that consumers give informed
consent to the collection, transfer, and use of their personal information.9 Once this consent
has been obtained, it is also imperative that consumers are adequately protected against the
risk of data breaches, identity theft, and cyber-fraud.10 By the same token, for all the potential
benefits of using new technology to promote greater competition, there exists the
corresponding threat that expanding access to large volumes of potentially sensitive personal
and transactional information will open the door to algorithmic discrimination and the
exploitation of consumer behavioral biases.11 Without question, successfully addressing
these—already well understood12—challenges will be key to building trust in this new financial
ecosystem.
Yet both proponents and critics of Open Finance have thus far ignored a far more
fundamental peril. This peril is rooted in the economics underpinning the development of this
new financial market infrastructure. The United States is home to over 10,000 banks and other
insured deposit-taking institutions.13 It is also home to thousands of brokerage firms, insurance
companies, and other incumbent financial institutions, along with a large, diverse, and rapidly
expanding ecosystem of fintech disruptors. This high level of industry fragmentation is the
source of massive coordination problems that make it difficult for financial institutions to
develop the standardized APIs necessary to unleash the promise of Open Finance. In the
absence of both a common industry standard or government intervention, responsibility for

9 See e.g. See Cesare Fracassi & William Magnusson, Data Autonomy, 74:2 VANDERBILT L. REV. 327, 373
(2020) and Kathryn Petralia, Thomas Philippon, Tara Rice & Nicolas Veron, Banking Disrupted? Financial
Intermediation in an Era of Transformational Technology, 22 GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY, 50 (2019).
10 See e.g. Xavier Vives, Digital Disruption in Banking, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. [forthcoming], 28; Petralia
et al., supra note __, 51.
11 As described in Parts II and III, this threat stems primarily from the use of artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and advances analytics to gain commercial insights from this information. For a discussion of
these threats outside the specific context of Open Finance, see e.g. Margot Kaminski & Jennifer Urban, The Right
to Contest AI, 121:7 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1957 (2021); Daniel Schwarcz & Anya Prince, Proxy Discrimination in the
Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2020); Talia Gillis & Jann Spiess, Big Data and
Discrimination, 86 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 459 (2019), and Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 677–80 (2016). See also Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms, Market Structure
and Antitrust Subcommittee, Final Report, 19-20 and 35-37 (July 1, 2019) [hereinafter, Report on Digital
Platforms], https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/market-structure-report%20-15-may-2019.pdf.

For previous scholarship and other work describing these and other technical challenges, see Nizah
Geslevich Packin, Show Me the (Data About the) Money!, 2020:4 UTAH L. REV. 1277, 1317-1318, 1325, 1328-1329,
and 1331 (2020); FINRA, Know Before You Share: Be Mindful of Data Aggregation Risks, Investor Alert (March 29,
2018), https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/be-mindful-data-aggregation-risks, and Fracassi & Magnusson,
supra note __, 358 and 373.
13 The highly fragmented structure of the U.S. financial services industry is described in greater detail in
Part III.A(i).
12
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developing these APIs has instead fallen to a small cadre of technology firms known as data
aggregators.
Data aggregators are the connective tissue of Open Finance—the technological pipes
through which the vast majority of customer information flows on its journey from one
financial institution to another. The success of Open Finance—at least in the United States—
therefore depends on the economics of data aggregation, and on the incentives of data
aggregators to invest in the development of this new infrastructure. These economics are
characterized by three mutually reinforcing dynamics.14 First, as producers of information
goods, data aggregators benefit from pronounced economies of scale and scope in connection
with the collection and analysis of customer information. Second, at its core, data aggregation
is a platform business: connecting incumbent financial institutions, fintech disruptors, and
their customers. Like Amazon, Google, and Facebook, data aggregation thus bears all the
hallmarks of a “two-sided market” in which strong network effects on each side of the market
serve to attract users on the other side. Lastly, the market for software developers exhibits
similar network effects, with the most talented developers wanting to write to the APIs of the
most successful data aggregators.
Together, these dynamics yield a clear and troubling prediction. In theory, we should
expect these economies of scale, scope, and network effects to erect significant barriers to
entry, undercut competition, and propel the embryonic data aggregation market toward
monopoly. And in practice, that is exactly what we observe in the marketplace.15 Today, a small
handful of data aggregators serves the entire U.S. financial services industry. Even more
importantly, one of these data aggregators—Plaid—has rapidly built a dominant market
position: providing API connectivity to more than 9,000 banks and other deposit-taking
institutions, and over 4,000 fintech disruptors, in the U.S. alone. This observation leads to a
stark and counterintuitive conclusion. In the short term, the new age of Open Finance may
very well promote greater competition, spur new innovation, and enhance consumer choice.
Yet in the longer term, the economics of data aggregation are likely to yield a highly
concentrated industry structure, with one or more data aggregators wielding enormous power
over the flow of customer information.
The emergence of this concentrated industry structure will inevitably open the door
to abuse of market power. This abuse could theoretically include both monopoly pricing and
the imposition of restrictions on platform access by data aggregators. Given their privileged
access to customer information, data aggregators may also be tempted to expand vertically
into the markets for the financial products and services currently supplied by the own clients.
The prospect that data aggregators will abuse this power may deter both incumbent financial
institutions and fintech disruptors from fully investing in the development and
implementation of Open Finance. Perhaps more importantly, this new market structure would
effectively recreate the informational vaults that Open Finance is designed to unlock, with data
aggregators supplanting banks and other incumbent financial institutions at the apex of the

14
15

The economics of data aggregation are described in greater detail in Part III.A.
The evolving structure of the U.S. data aggregation market is described in greater detail in Part III.B.
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financial system. Paradoxically, the end result may therefore be a new and more muscular
reincarnation of the golden rule of conventional finance.
The challenge for policymakers becomes how to fulfill the inherent promise of Open
Finance while simultaneously minimizing the perils associated with market concentration, the
abuse of monopoly power, and the creation of a new breed of too-big-to-fail institutions.
Meeting this challenge demands that policymakers strike a delicate balance. On the one hand,
policymakers should adopt policies designed to capitalize on any efficiency benefits available
at the edge of today’s technological frontier. On the other hand, policymakers must ensure that
the markets in which this technology finds its applications remain fundamentally contestable,
so that the forces of competition continue to drive innovation and push the boundaries of this
frontier tomorrow and beyond.
To meet this challenge, this Article lays out a blueprint for a new regulatory framework
governing the data aggregation market.16 This blueprint is based on four pillars. The first pillar
is a licensing regime for data aggregators that enables policymakers to collect information
about this rapidly evolving market, ensure that licensed data aggregators obtain informed
consent from customers, and protect customers against the risks of data breaches, identity
theft, and cyber-fraud. The second pillar—building on Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank
Act17—is a more active role for the federal government in promoting the development of
standardized APIs and other infrastructure designed to support customer data access, sharing,
portability, and interoperability. The third is the imposition of a universal access requirement
designed to ensure that data aggregators cannot unreasonably deny incumbent financial
institutions, fintech disruptors, or their customers access to their platforms. And lastly, this
blueprint calls for the structural separation of data aggregation from finance: preventing data
aggregators from directly or indirectly offering financial products and services.
In advancing this new regulatory framework, we acknowledge that the age of Open
Finance is not one that will be universally welcomed. Some observers will view it as further
accelerating the harvesting and commoditization of our personal information.18 Others will
question whether it is really possible for consumers to give fully informed consent, or to
protect them from the risks of data breaches, algorithmic discrimination, or exploitation.
While this Article brackets these questions, we do not seek to minimize their importance.
Instead, our message is aimed at the those who see Open Finance as the key to unlocking the
informational vaults at the heart of our current financial system. Our message is simple: be
careful what you wish for. While Open Finance holds out significant promise, the economics of
data aggregation, as highlighted by the concentrated structure of the data aggregation market,
pose even more significant perils. These perils demand new thinking, together with a new
regulatory framework for the data aggregation market.

16

This proposed regulatory framework is described in greater detail in Part IV.

Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act is described in greater detail in Part I.D.
See e.g. Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution, 11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 104 (2019) (coining the term “data
maximization” to describe the constantly expanding accumulation and analysis of consumer information).
17
18
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the core principles of Open
Finance, describes the role of data aggregators and other key players in the emerging Open
Finance ecosystem, and surveys the state of regulation in the United States and around the
world. Part II explores the promise of Open Finance as a technological platform for leveling
the informational playing field, promoting greater competition, enhancing consumer welfare,
and fostering a more resilient financial system. Part III then explains how the economics of
data aggregation are driving the emergence of a highly concentrated market structure that,
over the long term, threatens to derail this promise. Part IV concludes by advancing a blueprint
for how policymakers can promote the development of a diverse and vibrant Open Finance
ecosystem, while also limiting the distortions created by market concentration, preventing the
abuse of monopoly power, and avoiding the creation of a new breed of too-big-to-fail
institutions.
I. THE NEW AGE OF OPEN FINANCE
Technological advances are rapidly changing our relationship with information.
Innovations such as the internet, social media platforms, digital marketplaces, and
smartphones have placed an enormous amount of information at our fingertips. Yet they have
also paved the way for the commoditization of our personal information, fundamentally
changed the dynamics of market competition, and given rise to sophisticated new ways of
exploiting consumers.19 These rapid changes have spurred a growing movement—flying under
the banner of “Open Data”—calling on policymakers to better define and strengthen the legal
rights of consumers over their personal information.20 Open Finance represents a strand of
this broader movement dedicated to promoting data access, sharing, portability, and
interoperability within the financial services industry.21 This Part describes the core principles
of Open Finance, identifies the key players in this emerging ecosystem, and surveys the current
legal landscape in the United States and around the world.
A. The Core Principles of Open Finance
Whenever we open a new bank or brokerage account, apply for a loan, or take out an
insurance policy, we hand over an enormous amount of personal information: including, in
19 For a more detailed description of these trends and their dangers, see e.g. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE
STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016);
Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117
MICH. L. REV. 815 (2019), and Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __.
20 The term “Open Data” is used in a wide variety of domains: from government, to healthcare, to
academic research. While proponents of Open Data across these domains generally seek to foster open access to
information, in the context of digital markets this access is often viewed as a necessary but insufficient condition
for the advancement of policy objectives such as protecting consumers and promoting more vigorous
competition.
21 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Report on Open Banking and Application
Programming Interfaces (November 2019) (emphasizing the importance of data sharing in the context of Open
Banking—a subspecies of Open Finance—and its central role in promoting competition).
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many cases, our name, date of birth, marital status, home address, employer, salary, and social
security number. Thereafter, our bank, broker, or insurance company is in an advantageous
position to collect even more personal information about our spending habits, investment
decisions, net worth, and whether or not we pay our debts.
Importantly, the business models, information systems, and regulation of these
financial institutions have historically reflected the desire to maintain tight control over this
information. Your bank has powerful economic incentives not to share private customer
information with its competitors.22 It probably also spends millions of dollars a year attempting
to protect this information against the risks of fraud, information systems failures, and cyberattacks.23 And in the background, your bank faces the threat of potentially severe legal
sanctions for breaches of customer confidentiality.24 In theory, this private information can be
used to offer you better financial products and services. Yet in practice, the result has long
been a closed system in which your personal and transactional information resides within legal,
technological, and economic vaults to which only incumbent financial institutions enjoy
access. As we shall see, exclusive access to these informational vaults is ultimately what gives
these incumbents an entrenched advantage over both their own customers and any potential
competitors.25
Open Finance stands this closed system on its head. At the heart of Open Finance are
three intertwined principles. The first is data access. The starting point for meaningful data
access is the ability of customers to view the entire range of personal and transactional
information that a financial institution has collected and produced about them.26 This can be
achieved by expressly giving customers property rights over this information, or by placing an
affirmative obligation on financial institutions to provide this information to customers upon
request.27 The logical extension of data access is then data sharing: giving customers the power
22 See e.g. Ben Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,
73:3 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983) (describing the business model of banks as based on private information about
borrower and loan quality).
23 See e.g. Ron Shevlin, “How Much Do Banks Spend on Technology?” FORBES (April 1, 2019)
(reporting average annual IT costs for mid-size U.S. banks—banks with between $500 million and $50 billion in
assets—of 0.22% of assets. The report also notes that the IT costs of larger banks such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank
of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo was over 0.40% of assets—in each case reflecting several billion dollars
in IT costs per year).
24 See e.g. Laura Noonan, “Capital One fined $80m for Data Breach”, FIN. TIMES (August 6, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/a730c6a0-c362-4664-a1ae-5faf84912f20.
25 This closed system, and how Open Finance might open it up to greater competition, is described in
greater detail in Part II.
26 Of course, the principle of data access raises thorny but important questions about the type of
information that should rightly be viewed as belonging to a customer versus that which should be viewed as
belonging to a financial institution; see William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1135,
1148–52, 1164–68 (2019) and Joseph DeMarco & Brian Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation and the
New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J. 1016, 1024–26 (2019).

See Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __, 349-353. Fracassi and Magnusson view customer ownership
and the imposition of affirmative data access and data sharing obligations on financial institutions as necessary
complements. However, while we agree that this combination would represent a particularly strong set of rights
27
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to instruct financial institutions to provide their personal information to specified third
parties—including, most importantly, other financial institutions.28 Together, data access and
data sharing are the first fundamental building block of Open Finance.
Intuitively, of course, we might not expect strong data access and data sharing rights
to automatically yield meaningful benefits for consumers. Perhaps most importantly, if
financial institutions can comply with their legal obligations by providing information in
expensive and hard to use formats—e.g. hardcopy documents comprised of unstructured
text—then the practical benefits of data access and data sharing may be very limited. This
highlights the rationale for the second core principle of Open Finance: data portability. The
International Standards Organization (ISO) defines data portability as the “ability to easily
transfer data from one system to another without being required to re-enter data.”29 There are
essentially two types of data portability.30 The first—export portability—enables customers to
download a virtual snapshot of their personal and transactional data from the information
systems of one financial institution that can then be uploaded to the information systems of
other institutions.31 The key feature of export portability is therefore the demands it places on
consumers to manually download and upload their personal information each and every time
they want to share it with a third party. The second type of data portability—platform
portability—relies on an automated electronic interface to facilitate the transfer of customer
data from one financial institution to another.32 Unlike export portability, platform portability
thus theoretically enables the large-scale and continuous transfer of real-time customer
information between financial institutions. Just as importantly, platform portability enables
customers to control how their information is used, and by whom, without forcing them to
personally coordinate the transfer process.
The automation, scalability, and other efficiency benefits of platform portability are
reflected in the third core principle of Open Finance: data interoperability.33 The ISO defines
data interoperability as the “ability of two or more systems or applications to exchange
information and to mutually use the information that has been exchanged.”34 In a nutshell,
data interoperability envisions the development of standardized protocols that enable
otherwise independent or siloed information systems to send automated requests for specified
information to one another, and then to automatically receive the requested information in a
and obligations, it is not strictly speaking necessary for the purposes of ensuring effective data access or data
sharing.
28 Id.
29 See ISO/IEC 19941:2017 Information Technology–Cloud Computing–Interoperability and
Portability, section 3.2.1, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:19941:ed-1:v1:en.
30 See Gabriel Nicholas, Taking It With You: Platform Barriers to Entry and The Limits of Data Portability, 27
MICH. TECH. L. REV. 263, 269 (2021).
31

Id.

32

Id.

33 See Oscar Borgogno & Giuseppe Colangelo, Data Sharing and Interoperability: Fostering Innovation and
Competition Through APIs, 35:5 COMPUTER LAW AND SECURITY REV. 105314 (2019) and Fracassi & Magnusson,
supra note __, 353-358 (both describing data interoperability as a key component of Open Finance).
34 ISO, supra note __, section 3.1.1.
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specified format.35 In theory, this standardization enables financial institutions that follow
these protocols to simply “plug-and-play” into an existing network: giving these institutions
access to the customer data of other network participants without granting them direct access
to their underlying information systems.36
The technological workhorses of data interoperability are software protocols known
as application programming interfaces (APIs). At its most basic level, an API represents a
structured data sharing agreement between two or more network participants: a set of
common data standards, messaging formats, rules, and procedures that enable the information
systems of these network participants to communicate with one another.37 In effect, APIs are
the language, grammar, and syntax that enable information systems to describe the kind of
data that can be requested and retrieved, how to request and retrieve it, and the format in
which this data will be provided to the recipient. By specifying these inputs and outputs ex ante
and enshrining them in executable computer code, APIs facilitate the rapid and automated
transfer of an enormous amount of customer information across a potentially very large
network of financial institutions.
There are three types of APIs—each reflecting a different level of interoperability. The
first APIs used in the financial services industry were closed APIs designed to eliminate internal
data silos and enhance information sharing within large, complex financial institutions.38 More
recently, many financial institutions have also invested in the development of partner APIs,
pursuant to which a limited number of strategic partners seek to leverage enhanced data
sharing in order to improve data analytics, offer complementary services, or develop new
products.39 Lastly, open APIs are based on publicly available data standards that technically
enable any software developer to follow the relevant protocols and access the customer
information held by network participants.40 Whereas closed and partner APIs both retain
elements of the existing closed system, open APIs thus represent the purest embodiment of
the core principles of Open Finance.
Together, these core principles reflect the desire to promote what Professors Cesare
Fracassi and William Magnusson have labelled “data autonomy”: the ability of consumers to
See Markos Zachariadis & Pinar Ozcan, “The API Economy and Digital Transformation in Financial
Services: The Case of Open Banking”, SWIFT INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 20016-001, 6 (June 15, 2017)
(defining data interoperability).
36 Although, as described below, participation in this network will also hinge on whether the relevant
application programming interfaces are closed, partnered, or open.
37 See DANIEL JACOBSON, GREG BRAIL & DAN WOODS, APIS: A STRATEGY GUIDE (2012) (describing
APIs as “a way for two computer applications to talk to each other over a network using a common language
that they both understand”).
38 These data silos often reflect the fact that these large, complex institutions pursued growth strategies
based on mergers and acquisitions, leaving them with a highly fragmented patchwork of legacy information
systems; see Raj Chawla, “Legacy Systems Are Banks’ Achilles’ Heel”, AM. BANKER (June 4, 2021).
35

39 See BCBS, supra note __, 19 (defining a partner API as “an API created with one or two strategic
partners who will create applications, add-ons, or integrations with the API”).
40 Id. (defining an open API as “an interface that provides a means of accessing data based on a public
standard”).
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exercise control over their own personal information.41 As explained by Fracassi and
Magnusson, the concept of data autonomy envisions giving consumers “a set of rights over
their data that wrests control over data back from the large institutions that, until now, have
maintained a vice grip over it.”42 The economic benefits of Open Finance—especially in terms
of levelling the informational playing field, promoting greater competition, improving the
price and quality of financial products and services, and building a more resilient financial
system—are described in Part II.
B. The Open Finance Ecosystem
Perhaps not surprisingly, the age of Open Finance envisions a new financial
ecosystem—one that is already emerging in many parts of the world. While its size and
composition vary across jurisdictions, this ecosystem is characterized by the interaction of four
groups of key players. The first group is consumers. Consumers occupy a unique position in this
ecosystem as both the producers of the raw material—data—that is used to design and market
financial products and services, and as the end consumers of these same products and services.
This data can include personal information about the identity of consumers: e.g. where they
live and work, their family status, and economic circumstances. Importantly, it can also include
transactional information revealing where and when consumers shop, how much they spend,
and whether they pay their credit card and other bills on time and in full. This digital “gold”
and “platinum” can be extremely valuable in the hands of financial institutions, digital
marketplaces, and other merchants, who can use it to design better products and services,
develop more targeted marketing strategies, and potentially exploit any behavioral biases
revealed by consumer preferences and spending habits.43
The second group of key players are incumbent financial institutions: This expansive
category includes established banks, brokerage firms, asset managers, insurance companies,
and other financial intermediaries. There is no precise or universally accepted definition of
what makes a business enterprise an “incumbent.” Broadly speaking, however, incumbent
financial institutions will have been in business long enough to develop large and established
customer bases, and potentially a dominant market position. The age and size of incumbent
financial institutions may also create institutional path dependency: forcing them to rely on
outdated legacy information systems and, thus, relatively slow to adopt new technologies.
Accordingly, while incumbents may enjoy a comparative advantage in terms of the sheer
volume of consumer data in their possession, they will often find themselves at a comparative
disadvantage in terms of the use of cutting edge technology that would enable them to make
the most of this data. Viewed in this light, perhaps the most intuitively tractable definition of

41 In addition to data access, portability, and interoperability, the concept of data autonomy as articulated
by Fracassi and Magnusson also encompasses customer ownership of their personal data and strong cybersecurity;
Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __.

Id. at 333.
See Adam Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets, 166:2 U. PENN. L. REV.
305, 333 (2018) (describing consumer data as “digital gold” and transactional data as “digital platinum”).
42
43
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an incumbent financial institution is one that, whether intentionally or not, has created the
type of informational vault that Open Finance seeks to unlock.
Standing opposite incumbent financial institutions in the Open Finance ecosystem is
a third group of key players: fintech disruptors. Once again, there is no single, widely accepted
definition of “fintech.” As explained by economist Thomas Philippon: “FinTech covers digital
innovations and technology-enabled business model innovations in the financial sector. Such
innovations can disrupt existing industry structures and blur industry boundaries, facilitate
strategic disintermediation, revolutionize how existing firms create and deliver products and
services, provide new gateways for entrepreneurship, [and] democratize access to financial
services.”44 This broad definition captures digital lending platforms such as SoFi and Funding
Circle, stock trading and investment apps such as Robinhood and Acorns, and payment
platforms such as Venmo, Stripe, and Wise.
The distinguishing feature of these fintech disruptors is that their business models are
based on the use of advanced information technology—e.g. data mining and analytics,
machine learning, and artificial intelligence—to provide highly automated financial products
and services.45 Crucially, however, while these new entrants typically enjoy a comparative
technological advantage,46 they have historically lacked access to the raw inputs that would
enable them to capitalize on it: the detailed customer and transactional data in the hands of
incumbent financial institutions.47 The informational position, technological capacity, and
economic interests of fintech disruptors thus stand in sharp juxtaposition with those of the
incumbent financial institutions they ultimately hope to disrupt.
The last, and by far the least studied, group of key players are data aggregators.48 Data
aggregators are technological platforms that connect all the other players within the Open
Finance ecosystem (see Figure 1). These platforms develop and manage partner or open APIs
designed to access the customer data held by incumbent financial institutions and to share it
with fintech disruptors. There are two basic types of data aggregators. The first type serves as
a centralized repository of customer data, and as the technological conduit—the pipes—through
which this data is shared between financial institutions. The second type combines these roles
with the provision of advanced data analytics that enable their clients—both incumbent
44 Thomas Philippon, “The Fintech Opportunity”, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER
NO. 22476 (August 2016), 2.
45 See Xavier Vives, Digital Disruption in Banking, ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. [forthcoming], 2 (November
2019) (“the FinTech sector… can be understood as the use of innovative information and automation technology
in financial services.”) and Petralia et al., supra note __, 24 (identifying data analytics and automation as key
features of fintech business models).
46 See Petralia et al., supra note __, 38.
47 See Zhiguo He, Jing Huang & Jidong Zhou, “Open Banking: Credit Market Competition When
Borrowers Own the Data”, BECKER FRIEDMAN INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 2020-168, 2 (November 2020)
and Vives, supra note __, 8 (both noting that while fintech disruptors typically have less information, they often
have superior tools for analyzing it).

To date, the most sustained and informative treatment of the role of data aggregators in the United
States is by Professor Nizan Geslevich Packin; see Nizah Geslevich Packin, Show Me the (Data About the) Money!,
2020:4 UTAH LAW REV. 1277 (2020).
48
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financial institutions and fintech disruptors—to extract insights from this data that can
theoretically help them better design and market their products and services. In many cases,
data aggregators also interact directly with consumers: enabling them to aggregate their
personal data across financial institutions, and to control who has access to this information
and what they can do with it.
Figure 1: The Open Finance Ecosystem
Data (via APIs)

Data & analytics

Data aggregators
Account
aggregation

Consent
management

Customers
Incumbent financial
institutions

Fintech disruptors
Product market competition

For incumbents, partnering with data aggregators enables them to leverage cutting
edge technology, while simultaneously saving them the time and expense of striking individual
data sharing agreements with hundreds, if not thousands, of fintech disruptors.49 For nascent
disruptors, data aggregators represent a cost-effective way of outsourcing the development
and management of APIs, the extraction, aggregation, and analysis of customer data, and the
creation of robust front-end user experiences.50 This enables fintech entrepreneurs to focus
their time, energy, and other resources on the development of their core products and services.
Importantly, by bringing together these two groups of players, data aggregators thus serve as
the central hubs of these rapidly expanding informational networks—the connective tissue of
the emerging Open Finance ecosystem.
C. Open Finance Around the World
The relationships between the key players in the Open Finance ecosystem are
inevitably shaped by the extent to which the law supports the core principles of data access,
sharing, portability, and interoperability. Perhaps most importantly, the incentives of
49 See Amias Gerety & Nate Soffio, “Impacts of BaaS Intermediation on Embedded Finance”, QED
QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER, 4 (March 30, 2021), https://www.qedinvestors.com/blog/impacts-of-baasintermediation-on-embedded-finance.
50 See Petralia et al., supra note __, 43.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4045640

MACEY & AWREY, OPEN FINANCE

14

incumbent financial institutions to participate in this ecosystem, and on what terms, are a
function of both their legal obligations to provide access to and share customer data, and how
the law allocates the potentially significant costs of building the technological, operational, and
other infrastructure necessary to ensure data portability and interoperability.
At present, the laws supporting Open Finance vary widely across jurisdictions.51 At
one end of the spectrum, the United Kingdom has recently introduced a comprehensive new
legal framework targeting the retail banking industry.52 Unveiled in 2017, this “Open Banking”
framework imposes an affirmative obligation on the nine largest “high street” banks—
representing over 90% of domestic retail banking business53—to provide third parties with
free and continuous access to specific customer information.54 This information includes
transaction-level data for both personal and business current accounts.55 It also includes
information about the prices, charges, features, benefits, and other terms and conditions
associated with these accounts, along with those of commercial credit cards and small business
loans.56 At the request of the customer, this information must be shared with third parties in
a secure and standardized format.57 To ensure the protection of customer data, third parties
seeking access to this data must first register with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
comply with basic data privacy and security requirements.58
In addition to introducing legal rules mandating data access and portability, the United
Kingdom’s Open Banking framework also establishes a new governance structure designed to
promote data interoperability. At the heart of this structure is a special purpose body, the
Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE), funded by the nine participating banks and
overseen by the FCA, the Competition and Markets Authority, and HM Treasury.59 The
mandate of OBIE is to develop, publish, and update an open API—known as the Open Banking
Standard60—with the objective “to drive competition, innovation, and transparency in UK
retail banking.”61 OBIE is also responsible for developing industry guidelines governing data
See BCBS, supra note __ for an overview of different approaches to the implementation of Open
Finance around the world.
52 This framework was implemented under the Payment Services Regulations, 2017, No. 752 and UK
Competition and Markets Authority, Retail Banking Market Investigation Order (2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/retail-banking-market-investigation-order-2017.
53 See UK Competition and Markets Authority, Retail Banking Market Investigation: Final Report, 224, 237,
and 254 (August 9, 2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f6c00007a/retailbanking-market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf.
54 See Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017, Art. 12.
55 Id., Art. 14.
56 Id., Art. 12.
57 Id., Art. 10.
51

See Open Banking Implementation Entity (OBIE), “Enrolling onto the OBIE Directory: How to
Guide”
(2020),
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Enrolling-Onto-Open-BankingGuide.pdf.
59 Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017, Art. 10.
58

60
61

See OBIE, The Open Banking Standard (2021), https://standards.openbanking.org.uk/.
See OBIE, “About OBIE” (2021), https://www.openbanking.org.uk/about-us/.
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security and fraud protection, and for managing the process for resolving disputes between
participating banks, third parties, and API developers.62 Accordingly, despite the framework’s
relatively limited scope, the United Kingdom’s commitment to enhancing data access,
portability and, in particular, interoperability via the development of open APIs has, in the
eyes of many observers, marked it out as the early gold standard amongst Open Finance
initiatives.63
Another jurisdiction that has made significant strides toward implementing the core
principles of Open Finance is Australia. In August 2019, the Australian government enacted
legislation introducing a “Consumer Data Right” (CDR) giving individual and small business
customers the right to instruct businesses to share their personal information regarding the
consumption of goods and services with third parties.64 While the objective is ultimately to
expand the application of the CDR across sectors, the first stage of its implementation,
beginning in January 2020, targeted the retail banking industry—and specifically the country’s
four largest banks.65 The CDR will eventually enable customers to share a broad range of
information, including customer, product, account, and transaction data for savings and
current accounts, credit cards, mortgages, and other loans.66 Like the United Kingdom, the
Australian government has also established a new Data Standards Body responsible for
establishing technical standards governing consumer data sharing.67
The implementation of Open Finance in the European Union has thus far followed a
different, and somewhat more modest, trajectory. Pursuant to the recently revised Payment
Services Directive (PSD2), banks must provide objective, real-time, and non-discriminatory
access to customer account data to a wide range of third parties.68 However, beyond this basic
See OBIE, “Open Banking: Guidelines for Open Data Participants”, 16 (July 2018),
https://www.openbanking.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Guidelines-for-Open-Data-Participants.pdf.
63 Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note __, 8-9 (“the British Open Banking remedy stands out as the only
well-structured mechanism closely monitored by a government body… with the goal of delivering a sound
implementation of account data access.”).
64
See
Treasury
Laws
Amendment
(Consumer
Data
Right)
Bill
2019
(Cth),
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bills/r6370_aspassed/toc_pdf/19126b01.pdf;fileT
ype=application%2Fpdf.
65 See Australia Competition and Consumer Rights Commission, Competition and Consumer (Consumer Data
Right) Rules 2019 (September 2, 2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Proposed%20CDR%20rules%20%20August%202019.pdf and Consumer Data Right Rules–Data Sharing Obligations, Phasing Summary Table,
(September
2,
2019),
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Proposed%20CDR%20rules%20%20Phasing%20table%20-%202%20September%202019%20rules%20update.pdf.
66 Competition and Consumer (Data Right) Rules 2019, Schedule 3, section 6.5.
67 See “Consumer Data Standards: Standards”, https://consumerdatastandards.gov.au/standards/
(describing the role of the Data Standards Body in devising technical standards).
68 See European Council Directive, 2015/2366, 2015 O.J. (L 337/35), Arts. 64-68. PSD2 identifies two
types of third parties that are permitted to access consumer account information: so-called “Account Information
Service Providers” (AISPs), which enjoy read-only access to customer account information and (2) “Payment
Initiation Service Providers” (PISPs), which have the ability to initiate payments directly from customer accounts.
For a more detailed description of the PSD2 data access rules, see Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data,
Innovation and Transatlantic Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule, 31 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 573
(2020).
62
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data access rule, PSD2 does relatively little to advance the core principles of data sharing,
portability, or interoperability. As a preliminary matter, the access rule itself only applies to a
relatively narrow range of payment accounts.69 Unlike Australia, for example, the rule does not
cover savings accounts, credit cards, mortgages, or small business loans. More importantly,
PSD2 does not specify the format in which this data must be provided to third parties.70 Nor
does it envision any concrete steps to promote the development of open APIs or other
technical standards designed to enhance data interoperability.71 Especially when combined
with PSD2’s relatively onerous data security requirements, it is thus not surprising that many
third parties have initially reported struggling to gain timely and cost-effective access to
account information.72
Beyond the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union, a number of other
jurisdictions are starting to build momentum in the realm of Open Finance. Brazil, Mexico,
and Japan have all recently taken steps to introduce Open Banking frameworks.73 The central
banks in Hong Kong and Singapore have developed open APIs designed to foster
collaboration between incumbent banks, fintech disruptors, and data aggregators.74 And in
Canada, an Advisory Committee on Open Banking established by the federal government
recently delivered its final report laying out a detailed blueprint for implementing what it labels
“consumer-driven finance.”75 Collectively, these developments raise an important and
awkward question: where is the United States?

Specifically, PSD2’s data access rule only applies to “payment accounts,” which the Directive defines
broadly as “account[s] held in the name of one or more payment service users which [are] used for the execution
of payment transactions.”; Id., Art. 4(12).
70 Id., 366.
71 Id., 366-367.
72 See “The Sobering September Preview: Banks’ PSD2 APIs Far From Ready”, TINK (June 14, 2019),
https://tink.com/blog/open-banking/psd2-updated-sandbox/.
73
See
Banco
Central
Do
Brasil,
“Open
Banking”,
https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/financialstability/open_banking (describing Brasil’s Open Banking framework);
Greenberg Taurig, LLP, “New Open Banking Regulation in Mexico” (June 16, 2020),
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2020/6/open-banking-en-mexico-nueva-regulacion (describing Mexico’s
“Fintech Law”), and Sean Creehan & Paul Tierno, “The Slow Introduction of Open Banking and APIs in Japan”,
PACIFIC EXCHANGES PODCAST (May 2, 2019), https://www.frbsf.org/banking/asia-program/pacificexchanges-podcast/open-banking-apis-japan/ (describing the incremental implementation of Open Banking in
Japan).
69

See Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Open Banking Programming Interface (API) for the Banking Sector,
https://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-functions/international-financial-centre/fintech/open-applicationprogramming-interface-api-for-the-banking-sector/ and Monetary Authority of Singapore, Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs), https://www.mas.gov.sg/development/fintech/technologies---apis.
75 See Government of Canada, Press Release, “Government Welcomes Final Report from Advisory
Committee on Open Banking” (August 4, 2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentfinance/news/2021/08/government-welcomes-final-report-from-advisory-committee-on-open-banking.html.
74

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4045640

MACEY & AWREY, OPEN FINANCE

17

D. Open Finance in the United States
The United States has thus far taken what has been described as a “market-driven”
approach to Open Finance.76 Indeed, the only significant federal legislation in this area is an
obscure provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the omnibus
statute passed by Congress in the wake of the global financial crisis.77 Section 1033 of the
Dodd-Frank Act requires providers of financial products and services to make available to a
consumer, upon request, any information in their possession or control “relating to any
transaction, series of transactions, or to the account including costs, charges and usage data.”78
Section 1033 requires that this information be provided “in an electronic form usable by
customers”79 and mandates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to prescribe
standards “to promote the development and use of standardized formats for information,
including through the use of machine readable files, to be made available to consumers.”80
The financial products and services covered by Section 1033 include deposit-taking,
payments, check cashing, loans, real estate services, consumer reporting services, and financial
data processing.81 The CFPB is also empowered to expand the scope of covered products and
services in certain circumstances, including where a product or service is being used “as a
subterfuge or with a purpose to evade any Federal consumer financial law.”82 However, while
Section 1033 technically applies to a relatively wide range of financial products and services,
its scope and operation are uniquely limited in one very important respect. Specifically, Section
1033 only creates an express data access right in favor of customers themselves—it says absolutely
nothing about whether financial institutions must also share this data with third parties. As a
result, while Section 1033 takes constructive steps toward the introduction of one-off export
potability, it is silent on the core principles of platform portability and interoperability.
Following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010, the CFPB did not take
any public action to implement Section 1033 until October 2017.83 This initial foray involved
the release of non-binding principles governing the use of customer information by data

76

See BCBS, supra note __.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
77

Dodd-Frank Act, §1033(a). This broad data access requirement is then subject to several exclusions
for confidential commercial information, information subject to confidentiality laws, and other similar matters;
Id., §1033(b).
78

79

Id., §1033(a).

80

Id., §1033(d).
Id., §1002(5) and (15)(A) (together defining a “consumer financial product or service”).

81
82

Id., §1002(15)(A)(xi).

In fact, a search of the CFPB website reveals no references to Section 1033 whatsoever before the
publication of a request for information issued in November 2016; see CFPB, Request for Information Regarding
Consumer
Access
to
Financial
Records
(November
22,
2016),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/112016_cfpb_Request_for_Information_Regarding_Consum
er_Access_to_Financial_Records.pdf.
83
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aggregators.84 These principles, which the CFPB expressly acknowledges “are not intended to
alter, interpret, or otherwise provide guidance on” existing legal protections, essentially just
restate the core rights and obligations under Section 1033: including the obligation on covered
financial institutions to provide customers with timely access to their personal information in
a secure and usable format.85 The CFPB principles also encourage financial institutions to
obtain informed consent, ensure the security and accuracy of customer data, and put in place
mechanisms for resolving any customer disputes.86 Importantly, however, the principles do
not address the more fundamental uncertainty at the heart of Section 1033 regarding the ability
of customers to instruct financial institutions to share their information with third parties.87
The CFPB principles were followed by the publication of an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in November 2020.88 The ANPR lays out the background,
objectives, and core provisions of Section 1033, describes the evolving Open Finance
ecosystem in the United States, and identifies a number of questions on which the CFPB
sought comment from industry stakeholders, policy groups, and the general public.89 Amongst
other matters, these questions related to the costs and benefits of consumer data access, the
optimal scope of data access rights, the impact of greater data access on competition, data
privacy and security, and the role of the CFPB and industry stakeholders in the design and
implementation of data standards.90 The range of questions canvassed in the ANPR is both
thorough and important. At the same time, over a decade after the enactment of the DoddFrank Act, the fact that the CFPB has only recently started to seriously engage with these
questions demonstrates just how far the United States has fallen behind many other
jurisdictions.
In the absence of a well-developed legal framework, the burden of developing
common data sharing standards has largely fallen to the financial services industry itself.
Prominent industry initiatives include the Financial Data Exchange (FDX), a non-profit
consortium of incumbent financial institutions, fintech disruptors, and data aggregators
created with the objective of developing “a common, interoperable, royalty-free standard for
secure and convenient consumer and business access to their financial data.”91 NACHA, the
organization that governs the ACH Payment Network, has similarly created a standard setting

84 See CFPB, Consumer Protection Principles: Consumer-Authorized Financial Data Sharing and Aggregation
(October
18,
2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-protectionprinciples_data-aggregation.pdf.
85 Id., Principles 1 and 2.
86 Id., Principles 3, 5, 7, and 8.
87 Packin, supra note __, 1288.

See CFPB, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Consumer Access to Financial Records, 85 FED. REG.
71,003 (November 6, 2020).
89 Id., 4-16.
88

Id., 24-33.
See
FDX,
“About
FDX”,
https://financialdataexchange.org/FDX/About/FAQUS/FDX/About/FDX_US_FAQ.aspx?hkey=901b169a-cf60-48e3-88dd-a438f54c6c43#WhatisFDX.
90
91
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group called Afinis that has published several open APIs for use in the payments industry.92
Yet it would be remarkably shortsighted to view these initiatives simply as a burden—a digital
cross that the industry has been forced to bear. Indeed, as we shall see, the absence of
government intervention has created an enormous opportunity for at least one key group of
industry stakeholders to shape this emerging financial market infrastructure.
II. THE PROMISE OF OPEN FINANCE
In the eyes of its proponents, the new age of Open Finance holds out the promise of
a revolution. By leveling the informational playing field between incumbent financial
institutions and fintech disruptors, they believe Open Finance will inject much needed
competition into the financial services industry. This competition will then encourage the
development and adoption of new technologies—driving lower costs, better quality products
and services, and the emergence of a more resilient financial system. This Part describes the
still largely theoretical promise of Open Finance. Part III then explains why the concentrated
structure of the Open Finance ecosystem in the United States makes it increasingly unlikely
that this promise will be fulfilled.
A. A Level Informational Playing Field
The promise of Open Finance stems first and foremost from the benefits of unlocking
the tens of thousands of informational vaults at the heart of our current financial system. As
we have seen, the key feature of this closed system is that incumbent banks, brokers, asset
managers, insurance companies, and other financial institutions each enjoy a high degree of
control over the personal information disclosed to them by their customers, along with the
valuable payment and other transactional data generated over the course of their customer
relationships. To protect the economic value of this private information, the business models,
information systems, and legal frameworks of these financial institutions have for centuries
been designed to keep it out of the public domain: away from the prying eyes of competitors,
regulators, and even from customers themselves.
These vaults tilt the informational playing field in favor of incumbent financial
institutions. Incumbent banks, for example, can use this private information to screen and
monitor the creditworthiness of their existing borrowers. This gives incumbent banks an edge
over potential competitors, who would theoretically need to collect and analyze this customer
information from scratch.93 Compounding matters, where competitors are not able to obtain
or otherwise replicate all of this private information, incumbent banks will retain a comparative
See NACHA, “Available APIs”, https://www.nacha.org/content/available-apis.
93 There is a large literature in financial economics exploring the existence and impact of information
asymmetries between incumbent banks, customers, and competitors; see e.g. Robert Marquez, Competition, Adverse
Selection, and Information Dispersion in the Banking Industry, 15:3 REV. FIN. STUD. 901 (2002); Mitchell Pedersen &
Raghuram Rajan, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence From Small Business Data, 49:1 J. FIN. 3 (1994)
Raghuram Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992),
and Bernanke, supra note __.
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advantage in understanding the business and credit profile of their customers—enabling them
to more accurately price and better structure the terms of individual loans.94 This can lead to
a “winner’s curse,” where competitors are only able to attract customers away from
incumbents when they have underpriced the relevant business, credit, and other risks.95
Anticipating this prospect, competitors may rationally decide not to vigorously compete for
an incumbent’s customers, thus further solidifying the advantages of incumbency.
Incumbent financial institutions can also use aggregated customer information to gain
valuable insights into consumer saving, spending, and borrowing habits. These insights can
then be used to design better financial products and services, create more effective and
targeted advertising campaigns, and more accurately measure and price potential risks.96
Crucially, the larger the number of customers, and the more granular the information that
incumbents have about them, the more insights this information is likely to yield. Once again,
this gives older, larger incumbents a distinct informational advantage. Yet even if these
incumbents do not want to leverage customer information in this way, the simple ability to
exclude others from doing so serves to further entrench the competitive status quo.
Given these advantages, it should come as no surprise that incumbent financial
institutions have historically gone to great lengths to defend these informational bastions
against a succession of barbarians at the gate. Most recently, in response to the growing threat
posed by fintech disruptors, incumbents such as JPMorgan, PNC Bank, and Capital One have
been accused of throwing up an array of legal and technological obstacles: including restricting
third party access to online customer account information,97 blocking incoming internet traffic
from servers used by fintech disruptors,98 and forcing disruptors to enter into burdensome
data sharing agreements.99 These defensive tactics reflect the enormous economic value of the
private information currently locked away in incumbents’ vaults. They also highlight that, in
the absence of an affirmative legal obligation, incumbents typically possess powerful incentives
not to share this information with anyone—let alone their nascent competitors.

94 See Steven Sharpe, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer
Relationships, 45:4 J. FIN. 1069 (1990) (describing the informational advantage of incumbent banks and the
resulting prospect of the winner’s curse).
95 Id.
96 See Dirk Zetzsche, Douglas Arner & Ross Buckley, Decentralized Finance, 6:2 J. FIN. REG. 172, 197
(2020); Levitin, supra note __, 333.
97 See Jennifer Surane, “Capital One Restricts Third-Party Data Access, Upsets Customers,”
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06- 27/capital-one-restrictsthird-party-data-access-upsets-customers; Robin Sidel, “Big Banks Lock Horns with Personal-Finance Web
Portals”, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-lock-horns-with-personalfinance-web-portals-1446683450, and Yuka Hayashi, “Venmo Glitch Opens Window on War Between Banks,
Fintech Firms”, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/venmo-glitch-opens-window- onwar-between-banks-fintech-firms-11576319402.
98 See Penny Crosman, “The Truth Behind the Hubbub over Screen Scraping”, AM. BANKER (Nov. 12,
2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-truth-behind-the-hubbub-over-screen-scraping.
99 See Penny Crosman, “U.S. Bank Embraces Open Banking with Data-Sharing Agreements”, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/us-bank-embraces-open-banking-with-datasharing-agreements.
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Viewed in this light, legal frameworks supporting the core principles of Open Finance
can be understood as a direct response to this pervasive incentive problem. As Fracassi and
Magnuson explain: “Given these dynamics, regulatory pressure to improve and increase data
sharing within the financial industry is both desirable and necessary. Without it, it is likely that
efforts to create open, transparent financial markets will be slow and halting.”100 Put
differently, data access and data sharing rules are designed to compel incumbent financial
institutions to open their vaults, thereby neutralizing their comparative advantage and leveling
the informational playing field. In turn, leveling this playing field represents a necessary, if
insufficient, first step toward the objective of promoting greater competition within the
financial services industry.
B. More Vibrant Competition
The financial services industry has a competition problem.101 Despite the seemingly
relentless pace of technological innovation, empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of
the industry has almost completely stagnated over the last century. Economist Thomas
Philippon, for example, has measured the efficiency of the financial services industry in the
United States by comparing the quantity of assets held by financial institutions against the
spreads, charges, and other fee income generated on these assets.102 Remarkably, Philippon finds
that this intermediation ratio has remained relatively constant over the past 130 years at
between 1.5 and 2 percent.103 The financial services industries in the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France have been afflicted by a similar torpor.104
These findings suggest that the financial services industries in some of the world’s
most dynamic economies managed not to generate any efficiency gains over the course of a
century that saw the invention of the computer, dramatic advances in data storage and
processing power, and the emergence and widespread adoption of the internet.105 Most
importantly, these findings suggests that—contrary to what we would expect to observe in a
Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __, 353.
For research exploring the potential existence, nature, and extent of this problem, see e.g. Patrick
Bolton, Tano Santos & Jose Scheinkman, Cream Skimming in Financial Markets, 71:2 J. FIN. 709 (2016); Nicola
Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Money Doctors, 70:1 J. FIN. 91 (2015); Robin Greenwood and David
Scharfstein, The Growth of Modern Finance, 27:2 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013).
102 See Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement
of Financial Intermediation, 105:4 AM. ECON. REV. 1408 (2015) and Thomas Philippon, “The Fintech Opportunity”,
NAT’L BUR. ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER 22476 (August 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22476.
103 Id.
104 See Guillaume Bazot, Financial Consumption and the Cost of Finance: Measuring Financial Efficiency in Europe
(1950-2007), 16:1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS. 123 (2018).
105 Consistent with these findings, there is empirical and anecdotal evidence pointing to a lack of
competition within specific segments of the financial services industry: including banking, payments, and even
the burgeoning fintech market; see e.g. Carin van der Cruijsen & Maaike Diepstraten, Banking Products: You Can
Take Them with You, So Why Don’t You?, 52 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 123 (2017); Lawrence Ausubel, The Failure of
Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50 (1991); Victor Stango, Pricing with Consumer Switching
Costs: Evidence from the Credit Card Market, 50 J. IND. ECON. 475, 489 (2002), and Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018).
100
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competitive market—many technological advances have not driven down the cost of financial
products and services for consumers. As Philippon explains: “Financial services remain
expensive and financial innovations have not delivered significant benefits to consumers. The
point is not that finance does not innovate. It does. But these innovations have not improved
the overall efficiency of the system.”106
There are several possible reasons for this apparent market failure—competitive
frictions in the machinery of modern finance. We have already encountered the first source of
friction: pervasive asymmetries of information between incumbent financial institutions,
customers, and aspiring new entrants. A second source of friction is high switching costs.
Switching costs are incurred by customers in the process of moving their bank accounts, loans,
investments, or other financial products and services from one financial institution to another.
These costs include the time and effort necessary to search for cheaper, better quality, or more
individually tailored products and services. They also include the hassle of filling out
application forms and coordinating the process of transferring a customer’s personal and
historical transactional information to a new institution.
Lastly, many segments of the financial services industry are characterized by
pronounced economies of scale and network effects.107 Economies of scale exist when the average
unit cost of producing a product or service decreases as the volume of production increases.108
This bestows an advantage on larger financial institutions, who can supply products and
services to the market at a lower cost than their smaller competitors. Network effects,
meanwhile, exist when the addition of new customers increases the value of an institution or
network of institutions from the perspective of existing customers.109 Classic examples of
goods that exhibit these network effects include the telephone, email, and social media
networks and, in the realm of finance, stock exchanges, credit card networks, and payment
systems.110 In effect, the attractiveness of these network goods to any given user is a function
Philippon (2016), supra note __, 9.
For recent empirical research examining economies of scale in banking, see David Wheelock & Paul
Wilson, The Evolution of Scale Economies in U.S. Banking, 33:1 J. OF APP. ECONOMETRICS 16 (2018); Joseph Hughes
& Loretta Mester, “The Future of Large, Internationally Active Banks: Does Scale Define the Winners?” in
Douglas Evanoff (ED.), THE FUTURE OF LARGE, INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE BANKS (2016); Anne Kovner,
James Vickery & Lily Zhou, Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?, 3:1 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1 (2015); Elena
Becalli, Mario Anolli & Giuliana Borello, Are European Banks Too Big? Evidence on Economies of Scale, 58 J. OF
BANKING & FIN. 232 (2015); David Wheelock & Paul Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of
Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks, 44 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 171 (2015). For empirical research examining
economies of scale in payment systems, see Christine Beijnen & Wilco Bolt, Size Matters: Economies of Scale in
European Payments Processing, 33 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 203 (2009); Wilco Bolt & David Humphrey, Payment
Network Scale Economies, SEPA, and Cash Replacement, 6 REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 453 (2007).
108 See ROBERT FRANK, BEN BERNANKE, KATE ANTONOVICS & ORI HEFFETZ, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS, 32-33 (2019).
109 See Paul Klemperer, “Network Goods (Theory)”, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 915, 915 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
110 See e.g. Robert Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong
Securities Markets, 76 SO CAL. L. REV. 277 (2002) and Carmine Di Noia, Competition and Integration Among Stock
Exchanges in Europe: Network Effects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, 7:1 EUR. FIN, MAN. 39 (both examining
network effects within stock markets); Sujit Chakravorti & Roberto Roson, Platform Competition in Two-Sided
Markets: The Case of Payment Networks, 5:1 REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 118 (2006); James McAndrews, Network Issues
106
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of the number of other users. Importantly, this makes customers less likely to switch to new
institutions or networks that do not already enjoy a critical mass of existing customers. Like
economies of scale, network effects thus give larger financial institutions a comparative
advantage over their smaller rivals.111
These frictions generate a range of competitive distortions. Asymmetries of
information between financial institutions erect formidable barriers to the entry of new, more
innovative, and potentially more efficient competitors.112 These barriers are compounded by
economies of scale: while new entrants need large volumes of customer information to
effectively compete with incumbents, they also need to effectively compete in order to attract
new customers, and thereby acquire this information. Even where new entrants are somehow
able to gain a foothold in the market, high switching costs and network effects mean that they
may still face pronounced “lock-in” effects—undercutting the incentives of customers to
identify and switch to new financial institutions even when they offer superior products and
services.113 These lock-in effects will be particularly powerful where incumbents market and
sell a wide range of products and services: thus offering customers the convenience of a onestop financial supermarket, but also creating opportunities for tied selling.114 By insulating the
market from the forces of vigorous competition, these distortions can enable incumbents to
build and protect a dominant market position.115 Incumbents can then exploit this position by
charging higher prices, reducing the quality of financial products and services, and designing
these products and services in ways that exploit the behavioral biases of consumers.116
These distortions illuminate the fundamental logic underpinning the core principles of
Open Finance. As we have already seen, data access and data sharing rules represent an
important first step. Specifically, by dismantling the legal, technological, and economic vaults
at the heart of the existing closed system, these rules would reduce asymmetries of information
between incumbents, fintech disruptors, and their customers.117 In theory, this would enable
more and better use of valuable customer information. Yet where implemented on their own,
and Payment Systems, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA BUS. REV. 15 (November/December 1997), and Alistair
Milne, What Is In It For Us? Network Effects and Bank Payment Innovation, 30:6 J. BANKING & FIN. 1613 (2006) (each
exploring network effects in credit card networks and other payment systems).
111 See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994).
112 See ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of
User Data, 31 YALE J. REG. 401 (2014); Fracassi & Magnuson, supra note __, 377.
113 For a more detailed discussion of lock-in effects, see Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, “Coordination
and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects”, in MARK ARMSTRONG & ROBERT
PORTER EDS., HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2007). See also Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra
note __, 1.
114 Tied selling takes place when a firm makes the purchase of a product or service by a consumer
conditional on the purchase of another product or service. As a result, tied selling can be used to induce customers
to obtain multiple products and services from a single supplier. In the United States, tied selling is illegal pursuant
to §2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
115 See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 34-55.
116 Id., 12 (“There are many well-known problems that follow from lack of competition, including higher
prices, less innovation, and lower quality in all its forms”) and Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra note __.
117 See Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __, 377.
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data access and data sharing rules are unlikely to overcome the distortions created by high
switching costs, economies of scale, or network effects. Ultimately, granting customers legal
rights to access and share their information will be of little use where the cost of exercising
these rights remains high. By the same token, customers may find that these rights yield few
practical benefits—especially in terms of greater choice—where the universe of aspiring
competitors is restricted to those financial institutions that can singlehandedly bear the costs
of building the technological infrastructure necessary to support data sharing.
This is where data portability and interoperability rules come into play. Effective
network portability rules complement data access and data sharing rules by ensuring that
customers can easily transfer their personal and transactional information from one financial
institution to another, often with the click of a button. In turn, effective network portability
requires a high level of interoperability between the information systems of each of the
financial institutions—both incumbents and fintech disruptors—within a given network.
Ideally, this interoperability should facilitate the seamless real-time transfer of large volumes
of customer information within the widest possible network of financial institutions.118 Where
they can be developed, this makes open APIs the most desirable technological platform on
which to build an interoperable network.
Viewed from this perspective, legal frameworks supporting data portability and
interoperability hold out two potential benefits. First, by mandating network portability, these
frameworks can lower switching costs for customers, thus eliminating the hassle of one-off
export portability and, even worse, the prospect of having to manually enter detailed customer
information on new application forms.119 Second, by forcing incumbents to invest in the
development of the technological infrastructure necessary to comply with data portability and
interoperability rules, these frameworks can help ensure that the costs of building
interoperable networks are not borne entirely by aspiring new entrants. They can also help
economize on these costs by providing a coordination mechanism and governance structure
for the development of open APIs, data privacy and security rules, and dispute resolution
processes. Together, well-designed data portability and interoperability rules can thus reduce
barriers to entry by making it possible for fintech disruptors and other new entrants to exploit
the opportunities presented by data access and data sharing rules. In this way, the core
principles of Open Finance can enable a broader cross-section of financial institutions to
capitalize on economies of scale, while simultaneously reducing the competitive distortions
generated by high switching costs, network effects, and the associated lock-in effects.
Ultimately, if data access and data sharing rules seek to level the informational playing
field, data portability and interoperability rules seek to ensure that there is a large, diverse, and
competitive universe of players. In this more competitive financial ecosystem, both
incumbents and fintech disruptors would be forced to compete on the basis of quality, cost,
and other features in order to attract and retain customers.120 Greater competition would also
drive financial institutions to harness new technologies in order to deliver higher quality, less
See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 96.
See Vives, supra note __, 35.
120 See Vives, supra note __, 2; Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 96.
118
119
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expensive, and more individually tailored products and services. In theory, the net result would
be a more dynamic and efficient financial services industry, and one that offered more and
better choices for consumers.121
C. Better Financial Products and Services
Promoting more vibrant competition is all well and good, but the real question is
whether this competition yields meaningful and lasting benefits for consumers. This is a
difficult question to answer with any real certainty. Indeed, while the expectation is that
competition will drive the development of new, better, and cheaper financial products and
services, the nature of market competition means that we cannot confidentially predict what
those future products and services will look like and, thus, what benefits and costs they will
ultimately yield. Nevertheless, proponents of Open Finance point to a number of plausible
and potentially significant benefits that they argue provide a compelling justification for
forging ahead into this brave new world.
These benefits can be broken up into two categories. The first category includes
benefits stemming from the more effective use of technology by financial institutions to gather,
sort, and analyze the treasure trove of customer information that would be available within
this new financial ecosystem. The existence of this extremely large and deep dataset would
encourage financial institutions to invest in technologies—like APIs—designed to automate
the processes governing the collection, organization, analysis, and use of this information.122
Greater automation would then provide the technological backbone for the development of
a faster, more transparent, and more seamless customer experience.123 The existence of this
dataset would also encourage financial institutions to use advanced data analytics such as
machine learning and artificial intelligence to analyze this information with a view to extracting
valuable insights into customer preferences, risk tolerance, and saving, spending, and
borrowing habits.124 These insights could then be used to design better financial products and
services, and to market these products and services directly to the consumers who stand the
most to benefit from them.125
The combination of advanced data analytics and large, deep datasets could also be
used to improve the process of identifying, pricing, and managing various risks. For example,
Id.
A dataset is “large” if it contains information for a significant number of customers; a dataset is “deep”
if it contains a significant amount of information about each of these customers.
123 See Vives, supra note __, 9; Petralia et al., supra note __, 41, and BCBS, supra note __, 7.
124 See Vives, supra note __, 14; Petralia et al., supra note __, 41; Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __,
332, and Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 26.
125 Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __, 332, 339 and 340 (arguing that big data, artificial intelligence,
and mobile computing have the potential to dramatically improve individuals’ access to beneficial banking
services); Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 26 (“this targeting can also raise the quality of services
provided by platforms. When they can identify individual tastes at fine levels and personalize their services to
this taste, they often improve people’s lives.”), and Dirk Zetzsche, Ross, Buckley, Douglas Arner & Jon Barberis,
“From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance”, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 2017/007 (2017), 19, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2959925.
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by combining customer-specific information with insights from machine learning, artificial
intelligence, and alternative data sources such as social media, lenders may be able to make
better predictions about the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers.126 Supporting this
intuition, economists at the Bank for International Settlements have found that credit scoring
models based on machine learning techniques and the use of alternative data sources improves
default prediction compared with traditional credit scoring models.127 Similarly, a recent study
by the not-for-profit FinRegLab found that credit scoring models that use detailed customer
payment data are better than traditional tools for distinguishing between more and less risky
borrowers.128 Where the application of these new technologies yields better predictions, this
would enable financial institutions to more accurately price loans to reflect the risks posed by
individual borrowers, and then to more effectively manage these risks.129 In theory, these
technologies could also help reduce the impact of implicit biases in lending decisions, thus
potentially expanding the availability of credit to previously underserved borrowers and
communities.130
The second category includes benefits stemming from the more effective use of
information and technology by consumers. Open Finance can help improve consumer decisionmaking in a variety of ways. First, by breaking open the informational vaults of incumbent
financial institutions, effective data access, data sharing, and interoperability rules would
facilitate the aggregation of customer information across different institutions and
platforms.131 Using applications offered by institutions such as Mint, Yodlee, and Quicken,
customers could then use this aggregated information to create a single, comprehensive
snapshot of their personal finances.132 These snapshots can provide customers with useful
insights into their spending habits and overall debt levels.133 They can also promote better
household budgeting and long-term financial planning.134 Crucially, these snapshots reduce the
costs of keeping track of a customer’s personal finances, thus replicating the convenience of
using a single institution for all their financial products and services.135 This, in turn, further

See Petralia et al., supra note __, 41.
See Leonardo Gambacorta, Yiping Huang, Han Qiu, & Jingyi Wang, “How Do Machine Learning
and Non-Traditional Data Affect Credit Scoring? New Evidence from a Chinese Fintech Firm”, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPER NO. 834 (December 19, 2019).
128 See FinRegLab, “The Use of Cash-Flow Data in Underwriting Credit”, (July 2019),
https://finreglab.org/cash-flow-data-in-underwriting-credit-empirical-research-findings.
129 See Petralia et al., supra note __, 40-41.
130 See Vives, supra note __, 9.
131 Like many elements of Open Finance, this is already technically possible in many cases. Specifically,
where either (1) all the financial institutions used by a given customer use partner or open APIs to share data or
(2) the customer has manually downloaded the data and then uploaded it to a data aggregator or financial planning
app, the net result will often be the same.
132 See Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note __, 16.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See Aluma Zernick, The (Unfulfilled) Fintech Potential, 1 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECH. 352, 375
(2020).
126
127

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4045640

MACEY & AWREY, OPEN FINANCE

27

reduces potential switching costs, helps overcome consumer inertia, and promotes greater
competition.
Second, Open Finance can support the emergence of technology designed to help
consumers search for and compare financial products and services. Consumers face significant
time and other resource constraints. These constraints are compounded by the high costs of
identifying financial products and services that satisfy their specific needs.136 Indeed, even the
relatively simple task of comparing different bank accounts demands that consumers compare
prevailing interest rates, charges, overdraft fees, online account access, and other product
features.137 Consumers then need to determine which constellation of features is right for them
and their own unique circumstances.138 To help reduce these costs, recent years have witnessed
the emergence of online price comparison platforms like Nerdwallet, Credit Karma, and
WalletHub. These platforms use sophisticated algorithms to help consumers identify the
financial products and services that best suit their needs, and to compare the price and other
salient features of different options.
Crucially, the more information these price comparison platforms possess about
individual consumers, broader trends in consumer behavior and demand, and the universe of
available products and services, the more likely it is that their algorithms will identify the best
options for each consumer. In this way, Open Finance can help improve the quality of the
recommendations that these platforms make: thus promoting consumer confidence,
improving consumer decision-making, and encouraging consumers to actively shop around
for the best products and services.139 The existence of more confident, better informed, and
highly motivated consumers would then reorient the incentives of financial institutions—and
especially new entrants seeking to capitalize on the amplifying power of these platforms—
toward supplying products and services that catered to this more sophisticated, discerning,
and elastic demand.140
Third, by combining advanced data analytics with more and higher-quality
information, Open Finance can help overcome engrained biases in consumer decision-making.
In their book, Dollars and Sense: How We Misthink Money and How to Spend Smarter, behavioral
scientist Dan Ariely and lawyer Jeff Kreisler describe how overconfidence, emotions, and
implicit biases can lead to bad financial decisions.141 Importantly, Ariely and Kreisler see a role
for financial technology—apps—in improving the quality of these decisions and, ultimately,
enhancing consumer welfare. Specifically, in the same way that fitness and wellness apps help
us better understand the impact of our choices on our physical and mental health, financial
See Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra note __, 1 and 6 and Zernick, supra note __, 358.
137 See Melissa Lambarena, “How to Choose A Bank Account: Seek High Fees, Low Rates”,
NERDWALLET (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/banking/how-to-choose-a-bank-account.
138 The comparison process for even basic loan products can be even more challenging; see John
Campbell, Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17-20
(2016).
139 See Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra note __, 1.
136

Id.
See Dan Ariely & Jeff Kreisler, DOLLARS AND SENSE: HOW WE MISTHINK MONEY AND HOW TO
SPEND SMARTER (2017).
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apps can better frame how decisions about what to do with our money impact our overall
financial health.142 Thus, for example, apps can use past payment data and algorithms to predict
a consumer’s upcoming expenses, monitor their spending habits, and then alert them to
purchases that may result in short-term cash flow problems.143
In some cases, these apps could even replace consumer decision-making altogether:
identifying the optimal payment method for a given purchase in light of prevailing interest
rates, available rewards, or other features; calculating how much to transfer from a consumer’s
current account to their savings or investment account each month, or blocking late night
impulse purchases from online retailers.144 Like price comparison platforms, the quality of
these apps is ultimately a function of the amount and quality of available data. By unlocking
the informational vaults of incumbent financial institutions and building the technological
infrastructure necessary to share this data in real-time, Open Finance can thus improve the
quality of the products and services on which consumers increasingly rely to make important
financial decisions.
D. A More Resilient Financial System
The last, and perhaps least heralded, source of promise stems from the potential
impact of Open Finance on the structure and resilience of the financial system. In the existing
closed system, consumers, assets, and activities gravitate toward a relatively small number of
large incumbents. The seven largest banks in the United States have roughly the same stock
of financial assets as all other U.S. banks combined.145 Similarly, the vast majority of retail
payments flow through a tightly-knit network of large banks.146 And just a handful of large
players dominate the U.S. investment management industry: each managing trillions of dollars
on behalf of their clients.147 This concentration both reflects and reinforces high switching
costs and pronounced lock-in effects, thereby undermining vibrant competition and limiting
consumer choice. It also contributes to the emergence of financial behemoths that may
ultimately be viewed by policymakers as “too-big-to-fail.”
Id.
See Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra note __, 6 and Zernick, supra note __, 364-365.
144 Id.
145 These seven banks—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citibank, U.S. Bank National
Association, Truist, and PNC Bank—collectively have approximately $10.5 trillion in assets; see “The 15 Largest
Banks in the United States”, BANKRATE.COM (June 10, 2021), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/biggestbanks-in-america/. This is compared against total assets of all commercial banks in the United States of
approximately $22.2 trillion; see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release H.8: Assets and
Liabilities
of
Commercial
Banks
in
the
United
States
(September
1,
2021),
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TLAACBW027SBOG.
142
143

See Kimmo Soramäki, Morten Bech, Jeffrey Arnold, Robert Glass & Walter Beyeler, The Topology of
Interbank Payment Flows, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 243 (March 2006) (reporting that just 66 banks—
less than 1 percent of all chartered deposit-taking institutions—accounted for roughly 75 percent of the total
volume of inter-bank payments).
147 See ADV Ratings, “America’s Top 50 Asset Managers by AUM”, https://www.advratings.com/topus-asset-managers.
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As described by the Financial Stability Board, the global oversight body for systemic
risk, the too-big-to-fail problem arises when the threatened failure of a financial institution—
“given its size, interconnectedness, complexity, cross-border activity or lack of
substitutability”—forces policymakers to rescue it using public funds “to avoid financial
instability and economic damage.”148 In theory, the core principles of Open Finance can help
ameliorate the too-big-to-fail problem in at least two ways. First, by reducing switching costs
and barriers to entry, greater data access, sharing, portability, and interoperability can promote
the unbundling of financial products and services.149 Where customers no longer face the inertia
of high switching costs, we would expect them be more likely to shop around for the highest
quality, lowest price, and most suitable financial products and services. In many cases, this will
mean that each consumer obtains these products and services from several different financial
institutions. Simultaneously, armed with more information and faced with fewer barriers to
entry, we would expect fintech disruptors—many specializing in specific financial products
and services—to emerge to meet this new consumer demand. From a systemic perspective,
the existence of more and more specialized financial institutions would then reduce our
structural reliance on a small number of large incumbents.150 The result would be a less
concentrated, more diverse financial ecosystem that may be better able to weather severe
shocks without the need for government support.
The second way that Open Finance can help ameliorate the too-big-to-fail problem
and improve the resilience of the financial system is by reducing the economic fallout when
financial institutions do actually fail. As we have seen, banks and other lenders generate
valuable private information about the creditworthiness of their borrowers, the value of any
assets that these borrowers pledge as security against their loans and, ultimately, the quality of
the loans themselves. Where these financial institutions fail, there is a risk that this private
information may be lost, thereby making it more difficult for borrowers to obtain new loans
on the same terms. During periods of widespread financial instability, there is also the risk that
this loss of private information could contribute to a more generalized contraction in the
availability of credit. Research conducted by economist and former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben Bernanke, for example, has found that the loss of private information as a result
of local bank failures contributed to the depth and severity of the Great Depression.151
Inevitably, of course, at least some of this private information—especially so-called “soft”

148 See Financial Stability Board, “Evaluation of Too-Big-to-Fail Reforms: Summary Terms of
Reference” 1 (May 23, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P230519.pdf.
149 See Markos Zachariadis & Pinar Ozcan, “The API Economy and Digital Transformation in Financial
Services: The Case of Open Banking”, SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 20016-01, 5 (June 15, 2017) and
Mark Carney, “Building the Infrastructure to Realise FinTech’s Promise”, speech at the International FinTech
Conference (April 2017), https://www.bis.org/review/r170424d.pdf.
150 As explained by the Bank for International Settlements: “These could be services provided along
different segments of the financial service delivery chain that have traditionally been provided by banks, or new
non-financial services that create additional value to the delivery chain.”; Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note
__, 7.
151 See Bernanke, supra note __.
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information152—may be difficult to capture in electronic form. Nevertheless, insofar as Open
Finance would make it easier for borrowers to share this information with prospective new
lenders, it would also reduce the costs of institutional failure, guard against potentially crippling
credit contractions, and thus relieve some of the pressure on policymakers to undertake costly
and distortive bailouts.
____________________
In the eyes of its proponents, the promise of Open Finance stems from the prospect
that a level informational playing field will unleash the forces of competition—driving
technological innovation, the development of new and better financial products and services,
and the creation of a more resilient financial system. The trillion dollar question thus becomes:
could their eyes be deceiving them?
III. THE PERILS OF OPEN FINANCE
Even the most vocal advocates of Open Finance acknowledge the existence of legal,
technological, and other challenges that need to be addressed before it can fulfill its inherent
promise. As a threshold matter, any shift toward Open Finance must be accompanied by
mechanisms designed to ensure that consumers give informed consent to the collection,
transfer, and use of their personal information.153 It would also demand strong data privacy,
data security, and fraud protections,154 along with legal frameworks that clearly allocate liability
between incumbent financial institutions, fintech disruptors, and data aggregators for any data
breaches, identify theft, and cyber-fraud.155 And for all the potential benefits of artificial
intelligence, machine learning, and other advanced data analytics, the use of these tools pose
the risk of algorithmic discrimination and the possibility that financial institutions might apply
the insights they gain in order to exploit consumer behavioral biases.156 Successfully addressing
these challenges will be key to building trust in this new financial ecosystem.

See Jose Maria Liberti & Mitchell Petersen, Information: Hard and Soft, 8:1 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 1
(March 2019).
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See e.g. Fracassi & Magnusson, supra note __, 373; Petralia et al., supra note __, 50.
154 See e.g. FINRA, Know Before You Share: Be Mindful of Data Aggregation Risks, Investor Alert (March 29,
2018), https://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/be-mindful-data-aggregation-risks; Fracassi & Magnusson, supra
note __, 358; Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note __, 14-15; Remolina, supra note __, 35; Packin, supra note __,
1317-1318, 1325, and 1328-1329; Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 44; Borgogno & Colangelo (2020),
supra note __, 10.
153

See e.g. Petralia et al., supra note __, 51; Vives, supra note __, 28.
See e.g. Zetzsche et al. (2017), supra note __, 21; Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 19-20 and
35-37; Packin, supra note __, 1331. See also Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL.
L. REV. 671, 677–80 (2016).
155
156

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4045640

MACEY & AWREY, OPEN FINANCE

31

Yet proponents of Open Finance have all but ignored a far more fundamental
challenge. This challenge stems from the economics underlying the new infrastructure at the
heart of Open Finance: data aggregators. This infrastructure is characterized by pronounced
economies of scale, scope, and network effects that combine to erect significant barriers to
entry, undercut competition, and propel the market toward monopoly.157 These dynamics are
compounded by the highly fragmented structure of both the conventional banking industry
and the emerging fintech ecosystem. This Part describes the economics of data aggregation,
the emerging structure of the data aggregation market in the United States, and why the
promise of Open Finance—in terms of more vibrant competition, better financial products
and services, and a more resilient financial system—may ultimately be outweighed by the perils
of market concentration, the abuse of monopoly power, and the distortions created by a new
breed of too-big-to-fail institutions.
A. The Economics of Data Aggregation
The core principles of Open Finance seek to dismantle the informational vaults at the
heart of modern finance. However, while these principles are designed to level the competitive
playing field, the economics of data aggregation generate a powerful countervailing force:
driving industry concentration and consolidating market power, and threatening to undermine
vibrant competition. These economics are a function of the highly fragmented structure of the
U.S. financial services industry, economies of scale and scope in data collection and analysis,
the position of data aggregators at the center of a two-sided market, and network effects in
the market for API developers.
(i) Financial Services Industry Fragmentation
The United States is home to an extremely fragmented financial services industry. The
conventional banking industry offers an illustrative example. The United States is currently
home to over 4,900 federal and state chartered banks, over 5,000 credit unions, and over 270
thrifts.158 These institutions range from global banking giants such as JPMorgan, Bank of
America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo, to the thousands of regional and local banks that have
for centuries dotted the American landscape. Notably, this fragmentation is particularly stark
when compared with other jurisdictions that have highly developed financial systems, many
That proponents of Open Finance have ignored this challenge is even more remarkable given how
many of the them have expressed concern that “Big Tech” may eventually come to occupy a dominant position
in the data aggregation market; see e.g. Vives, supra note __, 12-13 and 18; Zetzsche et al. (2020), supra note __;
Zetzsche et al. (2017), supra note __; Borgogno & Colangelo (2021), supra note __; Zacharidis & Ozcan (2017),
supra note __; Remolina, supra note __ (all warning of the threat that Google, Amazon, Facebook, or other “Big
Tech” firms will enter the financial services industry).
158 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Data & Insights” (2021), https://www.fdic.gov/
(reporting 4,951 federal and state chartered banks); National Credit Union Administration, Credit Union and
Corporate Call Report Data: Quarterly Data (Q2: 2021), https://www.ncua.gov/analysis/credit-unioncorporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data; (reporting 5,029 credit unions); Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Financial Institutions List (August 2021), https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/charters-andlicensing/financial-institution-lists/index-financial-institution-lists.html (reporting 271 thrifts).
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of which have already adopted, or are in the process of adopting, the key principles of Open
Finance. Figure 2 highlights this fragmentation by comparing the number of banks and other
insured depository institutions in each of the United States, United Kingdom, European
Union, Canada, and Australia against both their total population and economic output.
Figure 2: U.S. Banking Industry Fragmentation in Comparative Perspective
Jurisdiction

Insured deposit-taking
institutions (IDIs)

IDIs per million pop.

GDP per IDI (USD)

United States

10,251

31.8

$2.0 billion

European Union

5,581

12.5

$2.7 billion

United Kingdom

345

5.1

$7.8 billion

Canada

88

2.3

$18.6 billion

Australia

53

2.1

$25.1 billion

Sources: FDIC, NCUA, ECB, PRA, OSFI, APRA, World Bank

On the other side of the emerging Open Finance ecosystem, the rapidly expanding
fintech industry is also characterized by a high level of fragmentation. While reliable and
comprehensive data is not available, global consultancy firm Deloitte estimated in 2017 that
there were over 2,000 fintech disruptors targeting banking and capital markets, over 1,500 in
the insurance industry, and over 400 in the investment management industry.159 There is also
evidence that the pace of new entry has only increased since 2017, with the United States being
one of the most popular jurisdictions for fintech start-ups.160 And like the conventional
banking industry, the fintech industry is home to firms of vastly different sizes: ranging from
household names like PayPal, Stripe, Robinhood, and SoFi, to small start-ups seeking their
first round of seed financing.
The fragmentation of the U.S. financial services industry is one of the key drivers of
the burgeoning data aggregation market. Developing the technological architecture necessary
to connect to and, importantly, compete in an Open Finance ecosystem can be extremely costly.
At the front end, this architecture includes developing a customer interface and user
authentication protocols. At the back end, it includes developing APIs, data management and
analytics tools, and security protocols. These technology costs are compounded by the costs
of designing bespoke APIs that are interoperable with those of other ecosystem participants,
and by the costs of negotiating sophisticated legal agreements with each participant governing

159 See “Fintech by the Numbers”, DELOITTE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/ru/en/pages/financial-services/articles/fintech-by-the-numbers.html.
160 See e.g. “The State of Fintech: A Recap of 2020 and a Glimpse into 2021”, FINEXTRA ((February 8,
2021), https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/19849/the-state-of-fintech-a-recap-of-2020-and-a-glimpse-into2021 (reporting that the United States was the “main catalyst” for growth in fintech investment).
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data sharing and the allocation of liability for data breaches.161 Importantly, while a small
handful of large banks and other financial institutions may be in a position to absorb and
amortize these costs, they will often be prohibitive for many smaller banks and fintech
disruptors—thus creating a potentially significant barrier to entry.162 As one senior industry
insider has observed: “only the largest banks have had the resources—and the time—to devote
to the extensive and technical application programming interface (API) integration, testing and
compliance, and the legal and contractual reviews necessary to meet [financial institutions’]
standards for data sharing.”163 Viewed from this perspective, data aggregators—which can
amortize these costs across hundreds, if not thousands, of customers—represent a turnkey
solution for the vast majority of banks, fintech disruptors, and other financial institutions that
simply do not have the financial, technological, human, or other resources needed to directly
connect to an Open Finance ecosystem.
Data aggregators also play an important role in reducing the coordination costs
associated with the development of standardized data access, sharing, portability, and
interoperability rules. In the absence of government intervention of the variety seen in the
United Kingdom with the creation of OBIE and the Open Banking Standard, responsibility for
the design and implementation of these rules in the United States has fallen to the financial
services industry itself. However, while a number of industry players have developed and
promoted the use of their own standards, the adoption of these standards has thus far
remained relatively modest.164 Stepping into this breach, the APIs, customer interfaces,
authentication and security protocols, and data sharing agreements developed and used by
data aggregators—and thus, indirectly, by their customers—have come to represent an
important source of de facto industry standardization.
Ultimately, the fragmentation of the U.S. financial services industry helps explain the
important economic role that data aggregators play within the emerging Open Finance
ecosystem. Yet we would not expect economic importance to translate into market power
where the marketplace was served by a large number of competing firms. To understand why
and how data aggregators might wield this power, we must therefore explore the economies
of scale, scope, and network effects that are driving increasing concentration within the data
aggregation market, along with the potential impact of this concentration on competition.
See Magnuson & Fracassi, supra note __, 355. See also Penny Crosman, Wells Fargo Strikes Data-Sharing
Agreement
with
Plaid,
AM.
BANKER
(September
19,
2019),
https://www.americanbanker.com/payments/news/wells-fargo-strikes-data-sharing-agreement-with-plaid.
161

See Magnuson & Fracassi, supra note __, 354 (“The cost for a small fintech startup to gain access to
this system—where there are thousands of different banks that must be taken into account, each with its own
website, authentication procedures, and account design—is high”); Packin, supra note __, 1300 (“While APIs are
becoming more common, their development can be pricey, which means smaller banks with fewer resources
might not utilize them.); Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note __, 6 and 9 (citing “the time and cost to build and
maintain APIs (particularly when done on a bilateral basis with multiple organisations)… and the economic cost
for smaller banks to develop and adopt APIs” as challenges.).
163 See “TCH Gives Banks an Open Banking Template”, PYMENTS.COM (November 15, 2019),
https://www.pymnts.com/data/2019/tch-gives-banks-an-open-banking-template/ (quoting TCH executive
vice president of product development and strategy, Dave Fortney).
164 See infra Part I.D for a description of some these industry initiatives.
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(ii) Economies of Scale and Scope in Data Aggregation
The data aggregation market is characterized by pronounced economies of scale. Data
aggregators produce information goods: facilitating the exchange of valuable consumer data
between incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors. While producing these
information goods typically involves high fixed costs to develop the technological platform
needed to safely and securely store and transfer this data, once the platform exists the
provision of these goods often involves little or no variable cost.165 For example, while the
costs of developing and launching a new mobile app like Instagram or TikTok may be
relatively high, the costs of making these apps available to each additional new user are
effectively zero. As a result, the average unit cost of supplying an information good like data
aggregation decreases as the number of customers increases.166 Put bluntly: scale matters in
the data aggregation market.
Importantly, data aggregators do not simply facilitate the transfer of data between
market participants. Many also apply machine learning, artificial intelligence, and other
advanced analytics to generate valuable insights from this data about consumer behavior,
preferences, and creditworthiness. Data aggregators can then use these insights to improve the
design and marketing of their own products and services, or sell them to both incumbent
financial institutions and fintech disruptors. Crucially, this strategy enables data aggregators to
leverage the economies of scale in information itself. As explained by Fiona Scott Morton and
her colleagues on the Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms:
“In digital markets specifically, scale offers an additional advantage. Firms can
apply machine learning to extensive data sets to improve their products and
expand their activities into new areas. Because machine learning yields better
insights when it is trained on larger datasets, firms with access to large amounts
of data can raise the quality of their services in ways that smaller firms cannot.
This creates a form of dynamic economies of scale, allowing large firms with
large amounts of data to raise product quality at lower costs than small
firms.”167
The result is a self-reinforcing feedback loop in which larger data aggregators enjoy access to
more information, more information enables these aggregators to better design and market
their products and services, and better products and services attract more fintech disruptors,
more incumbents, and ultimately their customers—thereby further compounding the
advantages of scale.

165

See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 13.

The average unit cost in this context is calculated by dividing the total costs by the number of users.
Because information goods involve high fixed costs and little or no variable costs, the total costs are largely static,
meaning that any increase in users will be reflected in a decrease in average unit cost.
166

167

See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 14. See also Maurice Stucke & Allen Grunes, BIG DATA

AND COMPETITION POLICY 170 (2016); Robert Wilson, Informational Economies of Scale, 6 BELL J. ECON. 184 (1975).
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The advantages of scale in data aggregation are amplified by significant economies of
scope. In many cases, the insights generated by applying advanced data analytics to extremely
large and multidimensional datasets can be used to expand into new markets.168 This is
especially true of markets for products and services that complement the core informational
goods already produced by data aggregators.169 Importantly, this includes the markets for many
of the products and services currently provided by their own clientele: the incumbent financial
institutions and fintech disruptors that use data aggregators to connect to an Open Finance
ecosystem. For example, a data aggregator’s ability to consolidate and track a customer’s
cashflows across multiple financial institutions could give it a comparative advantage in
offering products designed to help that consumer make realistic household budgets, monitor
their monthly spending habits, or provide short-term credit products that tide them over until
payday. It could also help them more effectively target these products and services to specific
consumers. These comparative advantages further reinforce the positive feedback effects of
scale by giving data aggregators access to more consumers, more information, and more profit
opportunities as their platforms grow in size.
Together, we would expect these economies of scale and scope to drive data
aggregators to invest heavily in the development of their technological platform, ultimately
with the objective of attracting both incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors
and rapidly expanding their market footprint. The winners in this race to scale would then
enjoy lower costs, more information, and be able to offer higher quality products and
services—thus erecting significant barriers to entry and potentially forestalling the emergence
of new challengers.170
(iii) Data Aggregation as a Two-sided Market
The economies and scale and scope in data aggregation are compounded by
pronounced network effects. Network effects are a common feature of so-called “two-sided”
markets.171 As explained by economists Jean Tirole and Jean-Charles Rochet: “many if not
most markets with network externalities are characterized by the presence of two distinct sides
whose ultimate benefit stems from interacting through a common platform.”172 Tirole and
Rochet offer the example of a manufacturer of video game consoles.173 Manufacturers like
168

See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 14.

169 A complement is a product or service that, when used in combination with another product or
service, increases the value of this second product or service from the user’s perspective.
170 See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 14.
171 See Mark Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125 (2009); Mark
Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668 (2006); Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien,
Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003); David Evans &
Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
WORKING PAPER NO. 18783 (2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w18783.
172 Jean Tirole & Jean-Charles Rochet, Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets, 1:4 J. EURO. ECON. ASS.
990, 990 (2003).
173 Id., 1015-1016.
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Nintendo and Sony need software developers to make games that customers want to play.
Simultaneously, however, software developers understandably want to make games that can
be played on the most popular consoles. The result is a chicken and egg problem in which
buyers are drawn to platforms with a wide range of sellers, and sellers are drawn to platforms
with a large number of prospective buyers. Accordingly, for a two-sided market to be
successful, the platform must attract a critical mass of participants on both sides of the market.
The data aggregation market bears all the hallmarks of Tirole and Rochet’s two-sided
market. On one side of the market, consumers want Open Finance platforms that allow them
to quickly and seamlessly transfer their personal information between the largest number of
financial institutions, thereby lowering switching costs and enhancing consumer choice. On
the other side of the market, both incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors want
access to platforms that have the largest number of consumers: both because they hope to
attract these consumers away from their existing providers of financial products and services,
and because more consumers means more data, which means more and better opportunities
to apply advanced data analytics to gain valuable insights into the behavior, preferences,
creditworthiness, and other attributes of these consumers.
Like economies of scale and scope, network effects drive two-sided markets toward
concentration. Once the number of buyers and sellers reaches a critical mass, platforms start
to generate their own gravity: with new participants attracted not only by the quality of the
platform itself, but also by the fact that it is widely used by other participants. In effect,
participants extract a benefit stemming from the existence of a large number of other
participants on the same side of the market because this, ultimately, is what attracts participants
to the other side of the market. Prospective new participants then face a choice between using
the platform or foregoing these benefits. Importantly, the platform can also influence this
choice via cross-subsidization: offering free access to participants—typically consumers—on
one side of the market, while monetizing access to participants—typically businesses—on the
other side.174 The result is enormous pressure on participants to use successful and popular
platforms, thereby rewarding the winners of the race to scale, generating lock-in effects, and
yet again erecting potentially significant barriers to entry. For this reason, competition in twosided markets is typically not within the market, but rather for the market itself.175
(iv) API Developer Network Effects
In many ways, data aggregation is actually a three-sided market. In addition to financial
institutions and their customers, the use of open APIs demands that data aggregators attract
a critical mass of API software developers. As described in Part I, open APIs theoretically
enable any software developer to follow the protocols published by a data aggregator and
thereby access—or “write to”—the relevant Open Finance platform. In some cases, these
developers are directly employed by incumbent financial institutions or fintech disruptors. In
other cases, they are independent contractors retained by these institutions to write the code
174
175

Id., 1017-1018.
See Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 6.
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necessary to access these platforms. Importantly, these software developers have a choice
about how to invest their time and talents: including whether to specialize in writing to the
API protocols published by specific data aggregators. Like the software developers in Tirole
and Rochet’s video game example, these API developers would prefer to write to the APIs of
data aggregators that already enjoy a large and entrenched base of financial institutions and
consumers.176 As an Open Finance platform becomes more popular, we would therefore
expect to see the emergence of a community of software developers dedicated to writing to
the APIs of this platform.
The strategy of outsourcing the development of open APIs to third party software
developers is a relatively common one in the technology industry. This strategy—known as
voluntary forfeiture—is designed to overcome the potentially severe hold-up problems that
developers would theoretically face when specializing in the proprietary APIs of popular
platforms.177 As we have already seen, the network effects generated by popular platforms
create high switching costs and pronounced lock-in effects. For software developers, these
effects are compounded by the costs of specialization: while developers reap the benefits of
specializing in the proprietary APIs of popular platforms, this specialization also leaves them
uniquely vulnerable to having these benefits expropriated by these very same platforms. For
example, once a sufficiently large community of developers specializes in the APIs of a given
platform, the burgeoning supply of developers may give the platform—as the only source of
demand—the power to drive down development prices to a level that fails to fully compensate
developers for their specialized expertise. Anticipating this problem, developers may rationally
decide not to make these investments in specialization in the first place, thus undermining the
success of the platform.
Voluntary forfeiture can be understood as a response to this hold-up problem and the
corresponding threat of underinvestment. By forfeiting a degree of control over API
development, the platform constrains its own future ability to restrict access to the platform
or otherwise exploit developers: thus addressing the fundamental power imbalance and
incentivizing developers to invest in specialization.178 Crucially, surrendering this control to
developers demands that the platform then identify and exploit other revenue generating

176 See Amias Gerety & Nate Soffio, “On Market Power—Who Reads, Who Writes, Who’s SOL”, QED
INVESTORS QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER (March 16, 2021), https://www.qedinvestors.com/blog/on-marketpower-who-reads-who-writes-whos-sol (“Consumer fintech or e-commerce startups naturally write to the APIs
of Plaid, Stripe, Twilio and Intercom as they build their MVPs. In each case, the little startup is a company that
writes to others’ APIs, and the larger companies have their APIs written to.”).
177 See Jonathan Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods,
124 HARVARD L. REV. 1861 (2011). In a nutshell, hold-up problems encompass situations where parties fail to
cooperate ex ante because of the expectation of ex post asymmetries in bargaining power. Hold-up problems can
be particularly acute in the presence of incomplete contracting, or where the cooperation contemplates the
sequential fulfillment of the parties’ obligations; see Oliver Williamson, Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22(2) J. LAW & ECONOMICS 233 (1979).
178 Id., 1866 (“By giving away access to core technologies, a platform holder commits against
expropriating (and thereby induces) user investments that support platform value.”)
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opportunities.179 In effect, for a platform to be both successful and profitable, free access for
developers needs to be combined with the sale of complementary products and services to the
platform’s other participants. In the context of data aggregation, the most obvious
opportunities stem from transaction fees and the provision of advanced data analytics to both
incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors. In theory, data aggregators may also
seek to monetize their informational advantage and technological superiority by directly
entering the financial services industry.
The existence of API developer network effects reinforces the tendency toward
concentration within the data aggregation market. Software developers want to write to the
APIs of the most popular data aggregators. Incumbent financial institutions and fintech
disruptors similarly want to do business with the data aggregators that benefit from the largest
and most specialized community of developers writing to their APIs. And consumers want
financial institutions that offer data-driven products and services, and that can quickly, easily,
and securely transfer their personal and transactional information to a wide range of other
financial institutions. These self-reinforcing feedback effects draw developers, financial
institutions, and consumers to the largest and most successful data aggregators, thereby
enabling them to tighten their grip over the emerging Open Finance ecosystem.
____________________
The economics of data aggregation—driven by financial industry fragmentation,
economies of scale and scope, and network effects—enable us to make two tentative
predictions about the future trajectory of the Open Finance ecosystem. First, the data
aggregation market is likely to be highly concentrated, with a small number of data aggregators
supplying the entire market. Second, this concentrated market structure is likely to present
opportunities for data aggregators to exercise market power. As described in Part III.B, the
first prediction is increasingly borne out in the context of the U.S. data aggregation market.
This enables us to speculate in Part III.C about how data aggregators might eventually seek to
wield their growing market power.
B. The Structure of the U.S. Data Aggregation Market
The economics of data aggregation are reflected in the embryonic structure of the U.S.
data aggregation market. This market is dominated by a small handful of data aggregators
including Plaid, MX, Yodlee, Yapily, and TrueLayer.180 These data aggregators are building the
technological infrastructure that connects the emerging Open Finance ecosystem: with their
Id., 1861 (“To generate revenues that cover development and maintenance costs, the platform holder
must regulate access to other goods and services within the total consumption bundle.”)
179

Finicity, another leading U.S. data aggregator, was acquired by Mastercard in November 2020 for $1
billion; Press Release, “Mastercard Extends Open Banking Efforts with Close of Finicity Acquisition”, FINICITY
(November 19, 2020), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20201119005883/en/.
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APIs serving as the rails on which the information of tens of millions of consumers travels on
its journey between the thousands of banks, fintech disruptors, and other financial institutions
across the sprawling U.S. financial system.181 Accordingly, while you have probably never
heard of any of these firms, if you use financial apps such as PayPal, Venmo, Robinhood,
Acorns, or Quicken Loans, you have used their Open Finance platforms.
By far and away the largest data aggregator is Plaid. Since its launch in 2013, Plaid has
quietly grown to become one of the world’s largest, most important, and most valuable fintech
companies. Plaid’s success stems not only from the quality of its technology but also, and
crucially, the number of established relationships it enjoys with both incumbent financial
institutions and fintech disruptors. On the banking side, it has been estimated that Plaid’s
clients currently include over 11,500 financial institutions across North America and
Europe,182 and Plaid itself has stated that its U.S. clients include over 5,000 federal and state
chartered banks and over 4,000 credit unions.183 If these figures are correct, that is virtually the
entire U.S. banking industry.184 On the fintech side, Plaid’s platform currently supports over
4,000 financial apps—including household names such as PayPal, Venmo, Sofi, Acorns,
Marcus, Coinbase, and Lending Club.185 By way of comparison, Plaid’s principal U.S.
competitors—MX, Yapily, and Yodlee—report having established client relationships with
1,800, 1,500, 1,400 financial institutions, respectively.186 These figures suggest that Plaid is very
clearly winning the race to scale within the U.S. data aggregation market.
One of the keys to Plaid’s success has been the order in which it has attempted to
attract the different sides of the data aggregation market. Plaid’s initial targets were the
software developers working with fintech disruptors. At the time Plaid was launched, only a
small handful of incumbent banks and other financial institutions had developed, or were in
the process of developing, their own closed APIs.187 More importantly, fintech developers
theoretically needed to write to the unique APIs of each individual bank. From the perspective
of these developers, Plaid’s single, standardized API was understandably viewed as an
attractive alternative to the prospect of being forced to write to the APIs of what might
ultimately be hundreds if not thousands of individual financial institutions. In effect, by
outsourcing the development of a standardized API to Plaid, these developers could dedicate
See Credit Suisse, “Payments, Processors, and Fintech”, Equity Research Report 109 (January 28,
2021) [on file with author].
182 Id., 111.
183 See Ginger Baker & Niko Karvounis, “Plaid’s Strategy to Facilitate an API-based Ecosystem”, PLAID
(November 19, 2020), https://plaid.com/blog/plaids-strategy-to-facilitate-an-api-based-ecosystem/.
184 These figures can be compared with Figure 2, which reports the existence of a total of 10, 251 banks,
credit unions, and other insured depository institutions in the United States.
185 Credit Suisse, supra note __, 111.
181

See Michael Deleon, “A Buyer’s Guide to Data Aggregation”, TEARSHEET.CO (February 19, 2019),
https://tearsheet.co/data/a-buyers-guide-for-data-aggregation/ (reporting a client base for MX of 1,800
financial institutions); Yapily, “Our API Coverage”, https://www.yapily.com/coverage/ (reporting a client base
of
1,546
financial
institutions),
and
Envestnet|Yodlee,
“Financial
Data
Platform”,
https://www.yodlee.com/financial-data (reporting a client base of “over 1,400 companies globally”).
187 See Plaid, supra note __.
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more time and energy to the development of their core products and services. As Plaid itself
has explained: “[t]he real shift here is this is standardized, almost open-finance-in-a-box. It’s
built around an API core and we can implement it at scale.”188
By definition, there is no such thing as a platform that is only able to attract one side
of the market. Perhaps not surprisingly, incumbent financial institutions were initially more
reluctant than fintech disruptors to enter into information sharing agreements with Plaid that
enabled it to access and share customer information. While this reluctance may have in part
reflected incumbents ‘s desire to protect their turf, it also reflected outstanding legal questions
around the ownership of customer data and potential liability.189 Nevertheless, as the
popularity of the products and services developed by fintech disruptors has grown (see Figure
3), so too has the pressure on incumbents to ensure that their customers can seamlessly
connect their bank accounts to these third party products and services. In fact, analysts at
global investment back Credit Suisse have estimated that the average U.S. bank account is now
connected to more than 15 financial apps and other services.190
Figure 3: The Rise of Fintech Apps
Number of app users (millions): 2014 - 2021
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See Penny Crosman, “Plaid Launches Exchange to Help Banks Share Data with Fintechs”, AM.
BANKER (May 19, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/plaid-launches-exchange-to-help-banksshare-data-with-fintechs (quoting Plaid global head of policy John Pitts).
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189 For an overview of these questions and issues, see Tomio Geron, “Plaid Built a $13 Billion Business
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Scenes.
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It’s
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PROTOCOL
(June
29,
2021),
https://www.protocol.com/fintech/plaid-1033-dodd-frank-open. See also Packin, supra note __, 1318.
190 See Credit Suisse, supra note __, 112.
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Ultimately, this demand-side pressure, combined with the shift towards digital
financial services as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic,191 has enabled data aggregators to
gain greater traction on this side of the market.192 And predictably, since Plaid offers
connectivity to the largest population of fintech disruptors, it has quickly become the data
aggregator of choice amongst incumbent banks and financial institutions including JPMorgan,
Goldman Sachs, Capital One, and Wells Fargo.
Having successfully attracted a critical mass of both incumbent financial institutions
and fintech disruptors, Plaid has recently turned its attention to their over 200 million
customers. In May 2020, Plaid announced the launch of Plaid Exchange.193 Plaid Exchange
gives incumbent financial institutions the ability to offer their customers a greater degree of
transparency and control over their personal information. Customers can log into Plaid
Exchange and view a dashboard showing how their information—including their name,
account numbers, account types, and outstanding balances—is being used and by whom.
Customers can then select which information, if any, they want to share with specific third
party financial institutions or apps. Plaid then stores and secures this information using endto-end encryption and shares it only in accordance with each customer’s instructions. In effect,
Plaid Exchange enables customers to turn Open Finance on or off with the click of a button.
At present, Plaid generates revenue from a variety of sources. Depending of the types
of products they use, Plaid charges incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors a
variety of fees. These fees include one-time charges for connecting a new customer account
to Plaid’s API, along with ongoing charges for each payment, transaction, or exchange of
information processed via Plaid’s platform. Over the longer term, Plaid’s plan is to supplement
these existing revenue sources with “value-added services” based on advanced data analytics:
including the development of automated platforms for processing online loan and mortgage
applications.194
Evidence of Plaid’s growing power within the U.S. data aggregation market was
recently revealed as part of a Department of Justice (DOJ) lawsuit brought against Plaid and
Visa Inc., the global payment processing giant.195 In January 2020, Visa announced that it had
entered into an agreement to purchase Plaid for $5.3 billion.196 The DOJ challenged the
acquisition on antitrust grounds: claiming that Visa’s rationale for the deal was its desire to
eliminate a nascent competitive threat.197 As documented in the DOJ complaint, senior Visa

See Geron, supra note __.
192 See Baker & Karvounis, supra note __; Geron, supra note __, and Packin, supra note __.
193 See Niko Karvounis & Jesse Dhillon, “Introducing Plaid Exchange”, PLAID BLOG (May 20, 2020),
https://blog.plaid.com/introducing-plaid-exchange/.
194 See Credit Suisse, supra note __, 112.
191

195 See U.S. Department of Justice, Complaint, United States v. Visa Inc. and Plaid Inc., U.S. District Court,
Northern District of California (November 5, 2020) [“DOJ Complaint”].
196 See Press Release, “Visa to Acquire Plaid”, VISA (January 13, 2020), https://usa.visa.com/aboutvisa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.16856.html.
197 DOJ Complaint, supra note __, 20.
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executives viewed Plaid as “the best of breed”,198 having “created a leading position of strength
in the business of connecting financial institutions in the United States”,199 and establishing
itself as “the preferred connector company by developers.”200 Visa’s CEO similarly described
Plaid as “by far the best player in the space”201 with “a huge lead in the connector business.”202
The DOJ ultimately agreed with Visa’s assessment, concluding that “Plaid’s extensive existing
connections with banks and consumers gives Plaid a substantial competitive advantage that
cannot be easily replicated by other firms.”203 The DOJ complaint prompted Visa to abandon
the proposed acquisition.204 Yet this has hardly proven disastrous for Plaid, which has
subsequently seen its implied market value increase to over $13 billion after closing a $425
million Series D financing round in early 2021.205 This valuation reflects the expectation that
it may soon be Plaid—and not Visa—that is everywhere you want to be.
C. Potential Competitive Distortions
The combination of financial industry fragmentation, economies of scale and scope,
and network effects are propelling the U.S. data aggregation market toward a tipping point.
Beyond this point, the eventual winner in the race to scale will find itself in a dominant market
position, able to wield enormous market power. The question therefore becomes how a
dominant data aggregator might seek to wield this power, and what the potential impact would
be on competition within the Open Finance ecosystem.
The first and most obvious way that a dominant data aggregator could exercise market
power is through the pricing of its products and services. The existence of pronounced lock-in
effects in successful platform markets leaves market participants—in our case incumbent
financial institutions and fintech disruptors—with a limited range of options in the event that
the platform raises its prices. The first option is for market participants to simply walk away:
thereby forgoing the benefits of platform participation, and potentially putting themselves at
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other market participants that elect to remain on the
platform. The second option is for market participants to invest in building their own rival
Open Finance infrastructure. Yet we might expect this option to be available to only the largest
market participants and, even then, involve significant financial, operational, and reputational
risks. This leaves the third—and in many cases only realistic—option: paying the new, higher
Id., 12.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id., 13.
202 Id.
203 Id., 11.
198

See Brent Kendall, AnnaMaria Andriotis & Peter Rudegeair, “VISA Abandons Planned Acquisition
of Plaid After DOJ Challenge”, WALL ST. J. (January 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-abandonsplanned-acquisition-of-plaid-after-doj-challenge-11610486569.
205 See Alex Wilhelm, “Plaid Raises $425M Series D from Altimeter as it Charts a Post-Visa Course”,
TECHCRUNCH (April 7, 2021), https://techcrunch.com/2021/04/07/plaid-raises-425m-series-d-fromaltimeter-as-it-charts-a-post-visa-future/.
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price right up to the point at which the dominant data aggregator has extracted all the
economic value from the relationship. As observed by Tirole and Rochet, the bottom line in
successful platform markets is that “[c]aptive buyers tilt the price structure to the benefit of
sellers.”206
The second way that a dominant data aggregator can wield market power is by
selectively restricting access to its platform. The threat of access restrictions is particularly
problematic in the data aggregation market given how embedded the technological
infrastructure of data aggregators is in the core financial products and services offered by both
incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors. For example, fintech disruptors like
NerdWallet and other price comparison websites rely on data aggregators to ensure rapid and
continuous access to customer account data held by incumbent banks.207 Similarly, a growing
number of banks rely on services like Plaid Exchange to offer their customers more
transparency and control over the access, sharing, and use of their personal information. The
result is a classic “bottleneck” problem: leaving the financial institutions that rely on this
technological infrastructure exposed to the risk that a dominant data aggregator will
unilaterally withdrawal access to it. This threat will then inevitably reside in the background of
any negotiations over the price of data aggregator’s products and services. Importantly, it can
also be used as a weapon where data aggregators compete in the same markets as their financial
institution clients.
This takes us to a third potential power play: the threat that a dominant data aggregator
might seek to expand into the markets served by its clients. At present, data aggregators are
part of a long vertical supply chain, providing a bundle of information goods to incumbent
financial institutions and fintech disruptors. In theory, however, there is nothing preventing a
data aggregator from simultaneously becoming a horizonal competitor: e.g. directly entering the
markets for banking, brokerage services, asset management, or insurance, or developing price
comparison, household budgeting, or other financial apps.208 Indeed, data aggregators would
likely enjoy a comparative advantage in these markets given their unparalleled access to
information and growing expertise in applying advanced data analytics to generate insights
into consumer behavior and preferences, design financial products and services, and market
these products to consumers. This makes reliance on a dominant data aggregator all the more
problematic: introducing the threat that they will eventually disintermediate their own clients.
Importantly, we might expect this threat to be particularly acute where the bundle of goods
that data aggregators provide includes a consumer-facing component—like Plaid Exchange—
that gives them the opportunity to build brand recognition and relationships directly with their
clients’ customers.
Lastly, once a dominant data aggregator decides to enter the same markets as its clients,
this will theoretically open the door to a whole new range of anticompetitive conduct. As a
206
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Borgogno & Colangelo (2020), supra note __, 7.
As Xavier Vives has observed, once a platform has established its position, “they can use their
comparative advantage to monopolize the segments where they operate and then expand their monopoly power
to other layers of business.”; Vives, supra note __, 22.
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preliminary matter, a data aggregator could selectively raise prices or restrict access to its
platform in order to put pressure on clients that rely on this platform to provide competing
products or services. In this way, a dominant data aggregator could exploit its monopoly over
the supply of an important intermediate input—customer data—to put its rivals at a
competitive disadvantage in the markets for the financial products and services in which they
compete head-to-head. Conversely, by entering the price comparison market, a data aggregator
could adopt what is known as a “pay for display” strategy: making its recommendations not
on the basis of the price, quality, or suitability of its clients’ products and services, but rather
on the volume of business, amount of revenue, or profits that these clients generate for the
data aggregator itself.209 A captive price comparison website could also be used to steer
customers toward a data aggregator’s own financial products and services.210 And perhaps
most troubling, a dominant data aggregator could use its privileged access to large
multidimensional datasets and expertise in advanced data analytics to identify and dissect
consumer behavioral biases, and then to design products and services that exploited these
biases.211
This analysis paints a clear, if somewhat troubling, picture. In the short run, an Open
Finance ecosystem connected by data aggregators may very well deliver on the promise of a
level informational playing field: spurring more vibrant competition, the development of
better financial products and services, and the emergence of a more resilient financial system.
In the long run, however, the economics of data aggregation point toward a highly
concentrated industry structure, with a small handful of data aggregators wielding enormous
market power. The prospect that these data aggregators will abuse this power may ultimately
deter both incumbent financial institutions and fintech disruptors from fully investing in the
creation of an Open Finance ecosystem. Perhaps more importantly, this new market structure
would effectively recreate the informational vaults that Open Finance was designed to
dismantle: with data aggregators supplanting incumbent banks and other financial institutions
at the apex of the financial system. The net result is likely to be less competition, a reduction
in consumer welfare, and the creation of a new breed of too-big-to-fail institutions.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The data aggregation market is still in its infancy. It might therefore seem prudent to
adopt a “wait and see” approach toward its regulation. Yet the pronounced economies of
scale, scope, and network effects that characterize this market represent highly durable sources
of market power: making it unlikely that new competitors will emerge and disrupt this
increasingly concentrated market structure. The challenge for policymakers thus becomes how
to fulfill the inherent promise of Open Finance while simultaneously minimizing the perils of
market concentration, preventing the abuse of monopoly power, and the avoiding the creation
of a new breed of too-big-to-fail institutions.
209
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Importantly, traditional antitrust law is not well-positioned to address this challenge:
both because of its narrow approach toward abuses of platform power212 and its potentially
limited application in the context of the financial services industry.213 And even if antitrust law
was entirely fit for purpose, effective regulation can often serve as a complement to robust
enforcement: enabling policymakers to take action before markets have tipped into an
uncompetitive equilibrium.214 To meet this challenge, this Part therefore lays out a blueprint
for a new regulatory framework governing the data aggregation market. This blueprint is based
on four pillars. The first two pillars—a licensing regime for data aggregators and a more active
role for federal regulators in advancing the key principles of Open Finance—are designed to
promote the development of a sustainable Open Finance ecosystem. The second two pillars—
a universal access requirement and the structural separation of data aggregation from
finance—are designed to avoid the perils that threaten to undermine this ecosystem’s
potentially transformative benefits.
A. A Licensing Regime for Data Aggregators
The cornerstone of this new regulatory framework is a licensing regime for data
aggregators.215 This regime would require data aggregators to obtain a license before providing
API connectivity, advanced data analytics, or other services to regulated financial institutions.
Once data aggregators had obtained a license, they would then be subject to three obligations.
First, they would be required to obtain informed consent from customers prior to accessing,
sharing, or using their personal or transactional information.216 The specific ways in which this
information could be used, and by whom, would also need to be clearly disclosed. Second,
data aggregators would be required to meet specified minimum technical standards governing
data storage, privacy, security, and fraud protection.217 Ideally, this would be combined with a
legal framework allocating liability for customer data breaches amongst data aggregators,
incumbent financial institutions, and fintech disruptors. Lastly, data aggregators would be
subject to ongoing reporting obligations designed to give policymakers a more accurate and
complete picture of the type of customer information they collect, who they share it with, and
how it is used to generate advanced data analytics and other services.
See Khan, supra note __ and Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 60-77 (both describing the
narrow approach of current antitrust law toward abuses of platform power).
213 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) and Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). For a more detailed description of how these decisions
have served to limit the application of antitrust law within the domain of regulated financial services, see Samuel
Weinstein, Financial Regulation in the (Receding) Shadow of Antitrust, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 447 (2019).
214 Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, 78-79.
215 This licensing regime would essentially take a page from Open Banking regimes in other jurisdictions;
see Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note __, 13. See also Zetzsche et al., supra note __, 32-33 (recommending a
licensing requirement for firms undertaking data gathering and analytics) and Packin, supra note __, 1316-1338
(anticipating many of the basic obligations that this licensing regime would impose on data aggregators).
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The creation of this new licensing regime would demand that policymakers address an
important threshold question: who should be responsible for the licensing and oversight of
data aggregators? In a recent report prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee, a group of
prominent economists, lawyers, computer scientists, and entrepreneurs recommended the
creation of a new Digital Authority.218 This Digital Authority would be responsible for
protecting consumers and promoting competition across all digital markets: encompassing not
only financial services, but also social media, online advertising, internet retailing, and other
digital marketplaces.219 A second, more modest, proposal would be to hand responsibility for
the licensing and oversight of data aggregators to the CFPB. The CFPB already has a statutory
mandate to protect consumers and promote competition in the markets for financial products
and services.220 The CFPB is also already responsible for coordinating the process of
implementing Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act.221 In this respect, the licensing and
oversight of data aggregators would arguably represent a natural extension of the bureau’s
existing mandate.
The creation of a licensing regime for data aggregators would yield several benefits.
For data aggregators, this regime would provide them with legal certainty around their rights
to access customer information, liability for data breaches, and other outstanding questions.222
For policymakers, a licensing regime would bring data aggregators squarely within the
perimeter of financial regulation: giving them access to more information about industry
structure and practices, and enabling them to set, monitor, and enforce compliance with
minimum technical standards. Together, enhanced legal certainty and minimum technical
standards would help to build public trust in the emerging Open Finance ecosystem. Perhaps
more importantly, a single federal licensing regime would serve as a coordination mechanism:
enabling policymakers to promote industry-wide investment in the standardized APIs and
other technological infrastructure necessary to enhance customer data access, sharing,
portability, and interoperability.223
B. Enhanced Data Sharing, Portability, and Interoperability
To date, the United States has adopted a market-driven approach towards
implementing the core principles of Open Finance.224 This laissez faire approach, combined
with the highly fragmented structure of the financial services industry, has given data
aggregators enormous influence over the direction and pace of both technological
development and network expansion. The second pillar of the proposed regulatory framework
would be to use the new licensing regime as a springboard for policymakers—whether it be
218
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the CFPB or a new Digital Authority—to take a more assertive role in the ongoing
development and evolution of the Open Finance ecosystem.
This new policy role could take many different forms, depending on the prevailing
level of industry cooperation.225 At one end of the spectrum, policymakers could use their
convening power to provide an informal forum for data aggregators, incumbent financial
institutions, and fintech disruptors to coordinate their sometimes disparate projects, promote
technological standardization, and resolve common technical challenges. At the other end of
the spectrum, policymakers could adopt specific regulatory rules designed to enhance data
access, sharing, portability, and interoperability. As a starting point, policymakers should
amend Section 1033 to explicitly permit licensed financial institutions to share customer
information with licensed data aggregators. Taking a page out of the United Kingdom’s Open
Banking initiative, they could then mandate the development of a single, standardized, and
open API framework for use across the entire financial services industry. Policymakers could
also require data aggregators and financial institutions to maintain online platforms that
enabled customers to manage their consents, access their personal and transactional
information, and quickly and costlessly share it with third parties.
Importantly, the rationale for this second pillar would not be to give policymakers the
power to dictate the direction of technological investment and innovation. Instead, it would
be designed to advance three decidedly more targeted objectives. The first objective would be
to lower industry coordination costs, thereby preventing overinvestment and technological
fragmentation that might otherwise serve to undercut the core principles of Open Finance.
Second, in addition to promoting technological standardization, this role would enable
policymakers to set, monitor, and enforce common minimum standards governing, for
example, the process for obtaining and updating customer consent, the rights of customers to
timely and complete access to information, and the obligations of financial institutions when
transferring this information to third parties. Third, this role would help ensure that any future
technological or market developments were consistent with the core principles of Open
Finance, and not simply designed to advance the business interests of key players. In this
respect, this role can be understood as a counterweight to the growing power of data
aggregators within the Open Finance ecosystem.
C. Universal Platform Access
The first two pillars of this new regulatory framework are designed to unlock the
inherent promise of Open Finance and promote the development of a more sustainable Open
Finance ecosystem. Yet on their own, neither of these pillars prevent data aggregators from
abusing their growing market power. As we have seen, a dominant data aggregator could
theoretically wield this power by charging monopoly prices, restricting platform access, or
using their informational advantage to directly compete with their own clients. Indeed, even
the credible threat that a data aggregator might resort to these anticompetitive strategies serves
Of course, this more assertive role could also involve the simultaneous use of different forms of
regulatory intervention: e.g. combining informal governance with specific regulatory rules.
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to shift the balance of power in their favor—potentially undercutting competition, stifling
innovation, and discouraging investment by other key players. Ultimately, preventing these
potential abuses and their damaging knock-on effects requires two more powerful remedies.
The first remedy is a universal access requirement. This universal access requirement is
designed to ensure that firms offering financial products and services enjoy non-discriminatory
access to Open Finance platforms. This requirement would consist of an affirmative obligation
on all licensed data aggregators to adhere to an open API standard that enabled any and all
regulated financial institutions to follow the published protocols, connect to the platform, and
access and share customer information.226 At the same time, data aggregators would be
required to publish a pricing schedule detailing any basic platform access charges, and to apply
this schedule universally to all clients. Crucially, this requirement would guarantee nondiscriminatory platform access for two distinct types of firms. The first includes the incumbent
financial institutions and fintech disruptors that rely on data aggregators for API connectivity.
The second includes other licensed data aggregators that aspire to enter and compete within
the data aggregation market itself.
There is ample historical precedent for the use of universal access requirements in the
context of network industries. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 requires all railroad
companies to “afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of
traffic”,227 and to “construct, maintain, and operate” switches connecting railroad lines.228 In
1982, the DOJ similarly required AT&T to provide its competitors—the so-called “Baby
Bells”—with open access to its long-distance telephone network.229 And since 1996, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has required electricity transmission facilities to
provide electricity generators with non-discriminatory access to the transmission lines and
other network infrastructure necessary to transport electricity from producers to consumers.230
Notably, while the technical details of these access requirements vary from industry to
industry, they are all designed to balance the benefits of scale, scope, and network effects with
the costs stemming from the potential abuse of monopoly power.
In the context of the U.S. data aggregation market, a universal access requirement
would yield several potentially significant benefits. First, by compelling data aggregators to
commit to an open API standard, this requirement would foreclose the prospect that a
dominant data aggregator—having attracted a critical mass of clients on both sides of the
market—might seek to pull up the technological drawbridge, switch to a partner or closed API
standard, and thereby capture the monopoly rents generated by its privileged market position.
Notably, this element of the universal access requirement could also be achieved by mandating the
development and adoption of a public API framework for use across the entire financial services industry.
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Second, the publication of a transparent and universal fee schedule for basic platform access
would prevent data aggregators from using differential pricing as a means of either restricting
platform access or channeling benefits to select clients. Along the same vein, it would prevent
data aggregators from using the threat of targeted access restrictions to extract higher prices
or other concessions.
Lastly, by ensuring non-discriminatory access to other data aggregators, a universal
access requirement would prevent the emergence of multiple closed platforms—so-called
“walled gardens”—characterized by relatively low levels of technological interoperability. Like
the informational vaults at the heart of conventional finance, these walled gardens are the
source of significant switching costs, thereby undercutting the economies of scale, scope, and
network effects driving the development of the Open Finance ecosystem. Importantly,
preventing the emergence of walled gardens would also play a critical role in ensuring that the
data aggregation market remained vulnerable to new entry: with the threat of competition
theoretically forcing incumbent data aggregators to make ongoing investments in platform
development and maintenance, and imposing an external constraint on potential abuses of
monopoly power.231 Viewed from this perspective, a universal access requirement would help
fill the regulatory gaps created by the absence of effective antitrust enforcement at the
intersection of platform markets and the financial services industry.
D. The Separation of Data Aggregation from Finance
The second remedy—and final pillar of the new regulatory framework—is the
structural separation of data aggregation from finance. Historically, one of the cornerstones
of financial regulation in the United States has been the separation of banking from
commerce.232 This separation reflects the concern that allowing banks to combine the business
of banking with the same commercial activities as their customers would give them an unfair
competitive advantage. Specifically, banks would be tempted to use their privileged access to
a vital commercial resource—namely, capital—to tilt the competitive landscape in favor of the
enterprises in which they had an ownership stake. In theory, this could be achieved either by
supplying capital to these affiliated enterprises at subsidized prices, or by offering
uncompetitive prices to other enterprises in the same industry.
This historical rationale for the structural separation of banking and commerce
perhaps rings hollow in today’s world in which commercial enterprises can theoretically obtain
capital from a wide range of financial markets and institutions—and where no single financial

Dan Awrey & Joshua Macey, “Open Access, Interoperability, and the DTCC’s Unexpected Path to
Monopoly”, Working Paper (July 14, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3885194.
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FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 190 (2d ed. 2018). Famously, this strict separation has been gradually
relaxed over time; see e.g. Saule Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the ‘Business of Banking’,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
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institution enjoys a dominant market position.233 Yet a fundamentally similar concern now
arguably exists within the data aggregation market, where the dominant position of a small
handful of data aggregators gives them increasing control over another vital commercial
resource: customer information. The resulting “data concentration”234 introduces the prospect that
a dominant data aggregator might eventually seek to leverage this advantageous position by
directly entering the markets for banking, brokerage, asset management, insurance, or other
regulated financial services alongside its own customers. This prospect raises the obvious
concern that the data aggregator would then tilt the competitive playing field in its favor:
providing subsidized access to customer information and advanced data analytics to its
affiliated financial services businesses.
Notably, this same fundamental concern is reflected in the growing chorus of
policymakers, academics, and industry observers warning about the growing market power of
Amazon, Google, Meta, and other “BigTech” firms.235 These firms share a business model
with data aggregators.236 Specifically, BigTech firms use their position at the center of twosided platform markets to collect, analyze, and monetize their privileged access to customer
information. As argued by Professor Lina Khan, currently the chairwoman of the Federal
Trade Commission, this business model enables these platforms to engage in a variety of
strategies designed to exploit the information they collect from their customers as consumers for
the purpose undercutting these same customers as competitors.237 This includes so-called
“platform envelopment” strategies, whereby a dominant platform operating in one market
seeks to expand into a second platform market, ultimately with a view to offering bundled
products and services.238 Where the products and services produced in these markets are highly
complementary—as they are in the case of data aggregation and finance—the net effect will
be to both expand and further entrench a platform’s dominant market position.
In the context of the U.S. data aggregation market, a universal platform access
requirement would go some distance toward limiting the potential use of these strategies.
However, while the publication of a universal fee schedule for platform access would prevent
some more explicit forms of discriminatory pricing, this remedy is not well suited to deterring
Indeed, concerns over the combination of banking and commerce were originally raised in the context
of the Bank of England’s monopoly over joint-stock banking in the decades immediately following its creation in
1694. This is not to suggest that there are not other, potentially more compelling, rationales for the structural
separation of banking and commerce.
234 For a more detailed discussion of the definition and risks of data concentration, see Daniel Rubinfeld
& Michal Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZONA L. REV. 339 (2017) and Josef Drexl, “Designing Competitive
Markets for Industrial Data”, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 16-13
(2016).
235 See e.g. Khan, supra note __; Report on Digital Platforms, supra note __, and Zetzsche et al., supra note
__.
236 Indeed, some BigTech observers even refer to firms like Google and Facebook as “aggregators”; see
e.g.
Ben
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(May
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more subtle, less detectable, forms of platform cross-subsidization or other anticompetitive
conduct. Accordingly, in order to completely foreclose the possibility that a dominant data
aggregator might seek to expand and entrench its market power by directly entering the
markets served by its own customers, data aggregators should be prohibited from owning,
controlling, being owned or controlled by, otherwise being affiliated with, or having a material
economic interest in any firm directly operating within the regulated financial services industry.
The structural separation of data aggregation from finance represents a powerful, and
inevitably controversial, remedy. Yet the potential efficiency benefits that might be lost of
virtue of this separation would seem to pale in comparison to the perils of market
concentration, the potential abuse of monopoly power, and the creation of a new breed of
too-big-to-fail institutions. Over the long term, these perils pose a far greater threat to market
competition than those used to justify the historical separation of banking from commerce.
Ultimately, promoting greater competition, innovation, and consumer choice today should not
come at the expense of these objectives tomorrow and beyond. Furthermore, imposing this
separation at this relatively early stage is likely to be a far more effective regulatory strategy
than waiting to see if these perils ultimately materialize—at which point path dependence, the
limits of traditional antitrust law, and the transformation of market power into political
influence will inevitably make it more difficult for policymakers to pursue meaningful
structural reform.
CONCLUSION
By unlocking the informational vaults at the heart of conventional finance, Open
Finance seeks to use new technology to promote more vibrant competition, contribute to the
development of better financial products and services, and support the creation of a more
resilient financial system. At the same time, the embryonic structure of the Open Finance
ecosystem suggests that this technology may soon be concentrated in the hands of a small
handful of key players: erecting significant barriers to entry, undercutting competition, and
propelling the market toward monopoly. This Article has illuminated the promise and perils
of Open Finance. It has also laid out a blueprint for how policymakers can fulfill its inherent
promise while simultaneously avoiding the perils of market concentration, the potential abuse
of monopoly power, and the emergence of a new breed of too-big-to-fail institutions.
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